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This thesis investigates corruption perception in civil service recruitment in the context of 
Azerbaijan. It specifically focuses on the State Examination Centre (SEC). The SEC is an 
interesting case because it is a public agency that, according to anecdotal evidence, is 
perceived as non-corrupt or corrupt to a minimal extent but operates in a highly corrupted 
context. The thesis aims to examine whether such anecdotal evidence reflects reality or not.  
Specifically, it seeks to understand how service users and experts perceive corruption in 
public administration overall and the SEC in particular concerning its organizational 
characteristics. It discusses the perception of corruption in relation to demographic 
characteristics of the users and organizational characteristics of the SEC, as viewed by the 
experts. The empirical basis comprises semi-structured interviews with nine service users 
and three experts and various SEC documents. 
The research has found that both service users and experts perceive the corruption in the 
SEC as low to very low. In addition, specific demographic characteristics such as gender and 
the employment sector have been linked to corruption perception. In contrast, such a link 
has not been found when marital status, education, and age were under consideration due 
to insufficient data. The research concludes that the anecdotal claims have scientific ground 
given that corruption perception in the SEC has been found very low. However, even though 
the SEC does have integrity, it is not an island. Several other organizations share a similar 
level of integrity as well. The thesis also proposes recommendations for further research 
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Azerbaijan, one of the post-Soviet countries, is often defined as a consolidated 
authoritarian regime (Habdank-Kolaczkowska, 2014, p.8). According to the Freedom House, 
in consolidated authoritarian regimes, political competition is prevented, and human rights 
violations are widespread.1  Azerbaijan has a semi-presidential polity system in which the 
President is the head of the state. The prime minister, appointed by the President and 
approved by the legislative body, is the government's head. Centralized administration, low 
political participation, the non-working rule of law, and prevailing corruption are also 
among Azerbaijan's political system (Karimov, 2018, p.2). According to Transparency 
International, Azerbaijan was ranked 126th out of 190 countries worldwide on the Corruption 
Perception Index,2 with a score of 30 (0 means highly corrupt, while 100 means no 
corruption).  
 “Corruption in Azerbaijan is perceived to be endemic and deeply institutionalized, 
permeating most spheres of public life, with entrenched political patronage networks and widespread 
conflicts of interest closely connected to the political elite” (McDevitt, 2015, p.15). McDevitt notes 
that even though Azerbaijan has nearly double GDP per capita than its neighbors in the 
Caucasus, it has the highest corruption perception (McDevitt, 2015, p.5).  According to the 
Global Corruption Barometer Report in 2016, 38% of Azerbaijani households stated they had 
been engaged in bribery to access essential public services in the last 12 months.3  These 
essential services include road police, primary and secondary schools, health care, and so 
on.  According to the Global Corruption Barometer, citizen-state interaction bribery is 
widespread (Bak, 2020, p.8), and there are also reports of illegal sales of the official post in 
the administration, army, education institutions, or other bureaucracies for pre-determined 
prices up to several thousand dollars depending on the rank in the patron-client pyramid 
(Meissner, 2011, p.7). These purchases will compensate the investment with illegal demands 
from public goods or services (Meissner, 2011, p.7).  In Azerbaijan, the executive branch 
1 See https://freedomhouse.org/reports/nations-transit/nations-transit-methodology accessed 20 June 2021. 
2 See https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/azerbaijan accessed 20 June 2021. 
3 Check the page n.18  https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2016_GCB_ECA_EN.pdf accessed 20 June 
2021. 
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dominates the judiciary and legislative branches, meaning limited executive accountability 
(McDevitt, 2015, p.15). 
Since 2016, Azerbaijan has been pursuing reforms to diversify its economy, lessen its 
dependency on oil, maintain a competitive environment and sustainable economic growth.  
The main document leading these reform efforts was the "Perspectives of National 
Economy."4 Moreover, several roadmaps were also designed for different sectors. Well-
operating public service is always needed to achieve the reforms. For that purpose, "the 
Strategy for Civil Service Development the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2019-2015" has been 
approved by the Presidential Decree. It aims "… to reform the governance in the civil service 
system, develop staffing capacity of the state bodies, as well as to increase the effectiveness of public 
authorities through forming the base of civil servants with high moral and ethical values, knowledge, 
skills, and personal qualities".5  
Currently, the State Examination Center is responsible for administering the civil 
servants' recruitment process in Azerbaijan. The SEC was established to ensure that the 
recruitment process is carried out legally and free from corruption. The former entity for 
recruitment (Civil Service Commission) had a good reputation when it comes to preventing 
corruption; it was seen as "a credible, clean agency with a good reputation and performance" 
(OECD, 2016, p.35). OECD monitoring team assessed its performance positively, 
emphasizing that it showed satisfactory performance in different respects, supporting 
merit-based recruitment practices, inviting civil society to interviews, and creating 
necessary appeals (OECD, 2016, p.34). The report wonders why the Civil Service 
Commission, the responsible entity for the civil service recruitment process in Azerbaijan 
before, was abolished, and instead, the SEC was established. CSC had positive feedback 
from the civil society representative, and whether this credible reputation will be the same 
for the SEC is debatable (OECD, 2016, p.36). 
In a highly corrupted public administration system, CSC was an exception with the 
perceived low level of corruption. Anecdotal evidence claims that the SEC follows the 
tradition, and now the students fairly take exams and get admitted to universities. The 
 
4 See https://iqtisadiislahat.org/store//media/documents/SYX/İqtisadiyyat_Yol_%20xeritesi.pdf  accessed 20 
June 2021. 
5See http://www.dim.gov.az/en/news/2834/  accessed 20 June 2021. 
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candidates for civil service positions must take an exam and interview to be offered a 
position. How can a person pay for being appointed to higher political positions in a country, 
but the same is not the case for lower positions in the civil service? The recruitment or 
appointment to the positions in the army, education institutions, and administration, which 
Meissner mentions that illegal sales are possible, was not organized or monitored by CSC 
(the same as the SEC now). Thus, it did not impact on the effectiveness of the CSC’s 
performance in preventing corruption in its activities. 
1.1 Research questions and relevance 
The study is guided by the following research question: 
1. How do users of SEC services perceive the level of corruption in the SEC?
2. How do they perceive the level of corruption of the rest of the public administration?
3. To what extent can these perceived levels of corruption be linked to users'
demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, education, and employment
status?
4. How do experts perceive the level of corruption in the SEC and the public
administration in general in relation to SEC's organizational characteristics?
Considering that it is a newly established entity, there is not much research exploring 
corruption perception in the SEC. Corruption in Azerbaijan is not a new phenomenon, but 
we know very little about how the situation is in civil service recruitment. Thus, this study 
aims to investigate whether anecdotal evidence claiming that the SEC appearing as a less 
corrupt organization in Azerbaijan's highly corrupt public administration reflects reality or 
not. Examining the perception of corruption in civil service recruitment will clarify whether 
Azerbaijan is going toward public administration based on meritocracy or patron-client 
relationship remains unchanged. In addition to that, it will also analyze the relationship 
between the perceived level of corruption and the demographic characteristics of the service 
users. Besides service users, the opinion of the experts in terms of the perceived level of 
corruption in SEC and the rest of the public administration will also be explored. Findings 
will contribute to the literature on civil service recruitment in Azerbaijan. If the SEC is an 
island of integrity in the corrupt system, it will allow studying some of its reasons. 
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1.2 Outline of the thesis 
The second chapter describes the context of the study, which includes information 
about the recruitment process in the SEC. The third chapter presents the literature review 
that starts with corruption theories and continues with research on the situation in 
Azerbaijan. It includes the discussion on the applicability of the theoretical frameworks to 
the Azerbaijan context. In the fourth chapter, research design and methodology are 
described. It also includes case selection, interview recruitment, interview design, and 
practical and ethical considerations. The fifth chapter presents and discusses the research 
findings, and conclusions are presented in the final chapter. The appendices and 




II. Context of the study  
2.1 About the SEC 
The SEC was established in 2016 by a Presidential Decree.6 The SEC is a public legal 
entity responsible for students' admission to higher education (undergraduate and 
graduate) and recruiting civil service personnel by conducting exams for state agencies and 
legal entities. 
As stated in Article 1.2. of the SEC Charter, the SEC is not a part of any larger 
organization and is considered an independently performing organization.7 The SEC is only 
accountable to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and it regularly informs the 
President about its activities. Article 9. specifies that only the President has the right to create 
or abolish the center. Even though the SEC is only accountable to the President, one can 
find different reports and statistics on the SEC's website.8 
  The Board of Directors manages the SEC, consisting of a chairman, two deputy 
chairmen, and four board members. Only the President has the right to appoint or dismiss 
them from their position. According to the State Examination Center of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan public legal entity's Charter, the board is responsible for deciding the center's 
development strategies, attracting more funding to the center, controlling the annual 
budget, and implementing it. 
 Article 6.6 clarifies how the SEC is funded. The SEC's funding consists of different 
resources, including funding from the state budget. In addition to that, the center also gains 
money from holding fee-based exams, grants, contracts signed with state entities, and sales 
coming from old equipment and properties belong to the center. The value of the Charter 
capital equals 1 million AZN (approximately 588000 USD).  The center can buy a new 
building, equipment, technology, or new transportation with income from fee-based exams 
and other publications.   
In the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Article no.109 specifies that the 
President appoints and dismisses heads of central apparatus such as ministries, collegial 
 
6 Check the Presidential decree https://president.az/articles/19240 accessed 20 June 2021. 
7 See the Charter http://dim.gov.az/center/nizamnama.php accessed 20 June 2021. 
8 See the website of the State Examination Center https://eservices.dim.gov.az/DQQ/DQreports/Diger accessed 
20 June 2021. 
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bodies, services, commission, and legal executive entities.9 Generally, there are two types of 
recruitment to civil service in Azerbaijan: general and specialized. Specialized recruitment 
is related to a specific group of state bodies with their recruitment and promotion system. 
Prosecutor's Office, Ministries of Justice, Defense, Foreign Policy, Internal Affairs, Tax, 
Migration; State Security, Intelligence, Customs Services, and Central Bank are the state 
bodies possessing specialized recruitment. The general civil service recruitment process 
includes open competition, which involves a written test and an interview. This process is 
applicable for the 1st-7th classification of administrative positions of the 1st – 5th category of 
state bodies. Before establishing the SEC, only the 5th-7th classification of administrative 
positions was subject to open competition by the CSC. The details related to the 
classification of positions can be found in Appendices. 
 
 2.2	SEC recruitment procedures 
Suppose there is a vacancy for a position in state bodies. In that case, the Civil Service 
Recruitment system in Azerbaijan works as follows (see Figure1: Civil Service Recruitment):  
1) The related state body sends a query to its employees and interviews those interested to 
see whether there is a match with the vacancy. 
2) If no suitable candidate is found, a vacancy for the position is transferred to open 
competition. 
3) The civil service recruitment process combines a written exam (usually held every 
month) and an interview. SEC prepares written exams for each group of civil service 
positions (for example, administrative leadership such as head and deputy of state 
bodies, departments, or administrative executive positions such as consultants and 
accountants). 
4) People who wish to participate in the competition register themselves online in the 
portal. 
 




5) SEC provides successful test-takers with a certificate that is valid for five years. (Those 
who have already worked at civil service for at least five years are not required to possess 
a certificate to be invited to interview). 
6) At least one person from the state body, one from SEC, and one independent expert 
interview the candidates who have valid certificates of completing the written exam. 
During the interview, candidates are asked questions related to general world outlook, 
professional and reasoning skills, and very detailed position duties. 
7) 3 experts scored the candidate and announced the results. Next, the head of the state 
body invites the successful candidate to meet and then decide who to hire. Finally, based 
on written test and interview results, the head of the state body decides who to hire. 
8) After the interview, if a candidate disagrees with the results, s/he has the right to appeal. 





Figure 1 Civil Service Recruitment Process 
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The individual hired must complete a six-month internship under the mentorship of a 
specialist. 
The written test examination process is organized based on law principles, 
objectivity, equality, transparency, and clarity. 10The subjects of the exam questions are the 
Azerbaijan language, legislation, information technologies, and logic. The list of the 
literature that questions are based on is publicly available on the SEC's website.11 The date 
and the location of the exam are decided at least 5 days before the exam date. Tests are 
graded automatically with the help of special machines. Exam results are published on the 
portal of the SEC. Participants of the exam have the right to complaint about the exam 
results within three business days. The SEC notifies the complainer about the decision on 
his/her complaint, and if not satisfied, the exam participant can sue the decision.  
The interview is designed to measure the candidate's knowledge of the vacancy 
position, preparedness for the position, world outlook, and other qualifications for the 
related position. The interview commission consists of 3 experts from the SEC, one from 
recruiting state body, and one independent expert. Commission acts based on 7 principles: 
1. The rule of law:  following the requirements of normative legal statements to arrange 
the interview, 
2. Objectivity: deciding whether the candidate is suitable for the position should be 
only based on an interview, 
3.  Impartiality: prohibited to include people to the interview commission who is a 
close relative of the candidate,  
4. Independence: nobody can intervene in the independence of commission members 
on holding interview and making decisions, 
5.  Equality: everyone irrespective of their race, ethnicity, religion, language, gender, 
origin, property holdings, position, faith, and political party, has the right to 
participate in the interview, 
 
10 See the law on Procedure for conducting an interview for the purpose of holding a civil service position 
http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/35861 accessed 20 June 2021. 
11 The list of the literature for a written exam arranged by the SEC 
https://eservices.dim.gov.az/DQQ/Elan/TestImtProq accessed 20 June 2021. 
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6. Transparency and clarity: usage of video recording with the permission of candidate, 
mass media's ability to attend in interviews, and publicly announcing the results, 
7. Professionalism: Grading based on revealing the potential abilities and their 
appropriateness for the vacancy position. 
Participants of the interview need to secure at least 16 points from possible 20 points to 
proceed to the next stage, meeting with the head of the recruiting state body. It must be 
arranged within 5 business days. As one candidate is hired for the position, the rest 
successfully passed candidates for the vacancy are added to the reserve list for future job 
openings. It is worth mentioning that the interview recording is preserved for 5 years by the 
SEC in case any complaint regarding the transparency and fairness of the interview. 
Upon completing the internship period, the individual is offered a three-month 
probationary contract followed by a long-term job contract. By that time, the other 
candidates who successfully passed the interview stage but could not be hired are added to 
the reserve list for two years. In case of any new vacancy in the state body, they are contacted 
first, and if a suitable candidate is found, the vacancy is announced on the SEC's website for 
open competition. 
 
2.3 Opportunities for corruption 
There are few issues in this setup. Karimov believes that not having open competition 
for supreme-3rd classes of administrative positions in the supreme category of state bodies is 
one of them (Karimov, 2018, p.5). The supreme category of state bodies consists of the 
Administration of President of Republic of Azerbaijan, including Administrative 
Department of the President, Special Medical Service of the President, Cabinet of 
Ministries, Milli Mejlis (Parliament), Constitutional Court, and Supreme Court. Supreme-
3rd classes of administrative position in supreme category state bodies cover Head and 
deputy head of division in Presidential Administration, Deputy head of state bodies in the 
supreme category, heads and deputy heads of state agencies and state services established 
under relevant executive bodies, specialists in the Presidential Administration, Office of 
Cabinet of Ministers, Office of Milli Mejlis and Constitutional and Supreme Court and 
many more. He further notes that “the recruitment process for this category involves direct 
promotion or internal interview, entailing a lack of transparency that casts doubt on the 
implementation of meritocratic principles at the highest level of public administration” (Karimov, 
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2018, p.5). As a result, it is unknown to the public whether the most qualified candidate 
secured the position or not. The latest statistics show that in January 2019, Azerbaijan has 
29.368 civil servants, and 1383 had a position in the supreme-3rd category of administrative 
positions. However, it does not specify how many of them were recruited without open 
competition based on merit.12 One can add discretionary appointment of 239 deputy head of 
local executive bodies on top as well.  Even though the SEC is responsible for civil service 
recruitment based on meritocracy, recruitment without open competition brings questions 
related to transparency and competitiveness of the recruitment.  
Another issue is the last phase of the recruitment process. Thinking about the 
possible corruption opportunities, the most unlikely option is test examination because it is 
objective. Everyone gets the same test which has only one true answer. However, the same 
cannot be told for the interview process because the experts and questions change, and 
grading is subjective. The possible corruption opportunity is to bribe recruiting state body 
because s/he connects with the last word to select a candidate for the vacancy.   Here, 
recruiting state bodies stands for the body with a vacancy to recruit civil servants, not the 
SEC. 
Additionally, several candidates may pass the interview stage, and no criteria are 
stating that the candidate who achieves the highest result from the interview will be 
recruited. It also decreases the competitiveness the recruitment. On top of it, there is no 
justification provided for the decision. Parrado also highlighted that those personal 
connections were vital to look at in direct recruitment or promotions (Parrado, 2014, p.49).  
The SEC expert may not be interested in engaging in corruption because if any appeal is 
made, they must coordinate the appeal and new interview process once more. Even though 
to ensure transparency, the interview process is video recorded with the candidate's 
permission, it only covers one portion of recruitment. The SEC also ensures that 
competition results (who is hired for the position and added to the reserve list) are publicly 
published on their website and recruiting state bodies. These issues might negatively affect 
 
12 Check the statistics named "Number of employees holding civil service positions" under the heading "Civil 
Service" on the   website of the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
https://www.stat.gov.az/source/labour/?lang=en accessed 20 June 2021. 
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the SEC's corruption perception because they arrange the interviews, and any negative 
experience will be associated with higher corruption perception in the SEC.  
 
2.4 Abolishment of the CSC 
There was no other analysis of the CSC abolishment; thus, I only had local news stream 
as an option to dig into. 2016, the CSC was responsible for recruiting civil servants; however, 
the State Commission on Student Admission (SCSA) held exams for this purpose (Kaspi, 
2016). At that time, the SCSA was the responsible body for student admission to higher 
education. As an education expert Vurgun Eyyub explained, there was inconsistency 
between the name of the SCSA and its activities. The name of the SEC enhances the 
responsibility and activities of the entity (Pia.az, 2016). Another expert Ejder Aghayev 
mentioned that the creation of the SEC was a necessity because there was no systematic 
process of civil service recruitment before (Pia.az, 2016). In 2016, the President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan signed a decree to establish the SEC responsible for both admissions 
to higher education and training and civil recruitment and once registered to abolish both 
CSC and SCSA.  The establishment of the SEC consolidated the tasks of CSA and SCSA 
under one roof. However, the OECD mentions that some of the responsibilities, such as 
performance appraisal and enforcement of ethics rules, were not handed over to the SEC 
(OECD, 2016, p.6).  The report further claims that the unification of both bodies might be 
explained by cost efficiency in public administration. 
The third chapter presents the literature review that starts with corruption theories and 
continues with research on the situation in Azerbaijan. It includes the discussion on the 
applicability of the theoretical frameworks to the Azerbaijan context. In the fourth chapter, 
research design and methodology are described. It also includes case selection, interview 
recruitment, interview design, and practical and ethical considerations. The fifth chapter 
presents and discusses the research findings, and conclusions are presented in the final 
chapter. The appendices and bibliography follow these chapters. 
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III. Literature Review and Theoretical 
Framework 
In this chapter, I review the existing literature on corruption. In the first part, I discuss 
the definition of corruption, including Klitgaard's corruption formula and classification of 
corruption based on scale and motive. This is followed by a discussion on what affects the 
perception of corruption, accompanied by the literature review, which focuses more 
specifically on the situation in Azerbaijan. Finally, theoretical discussions are followed by a 
summary of the chapter. The first step in selecting relevant literature was based on a search 
using Google Scholar and several University of Bergen library databases. The main 
keywords used in the search included "Civil Service Recruitment in Azerbaijan," 
"Corruption in Azerbaijan," "Meritocracy," and "Merit-based recruitment."  The second step 
was essentially a snowballing approach, focusing on the sources used by the literature found 
in the first step. This approach was used both for the general literature on corruption and 
for the studies focusing on Azerbaijan. 
 
3.1 Corruption and its types 
Since the mid-1990s, the relationship between quality of government and corruption 
has been in particular focus of social sciences. Rothstein and Teorell note that increased 
interest in this relationship revealed some meaningful instances (Holmberg et al., 2014, p.14), 
such as that the countries that are reasonably free from corruption produce a better quality 
of governance. This is due to the quality government institutions that have strict control of 
corruption and the rule of law and maintains economic growth. Another set of literature 
supports that the consequences of bad governance appear as corruption and insufficient 
property rights. However, defining quality of governance as the absence of corruption is also 
problematic because practices that are labeled as corruption in some contexts (such as 
clientelism, absence of the rule of law, nepotism) are not considered as corruption in the 
others (Holmberg et al., 2014, p.19). 
The definition and the concept of corruption have changed over the centuries, and 
still, the debate is going on. Interestingly, the United Nations Convention Against 
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Corruption does not define the term. Instead, the Convention deals with five main issues: 
preventive measures, criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation, asset 
recovery, technical assistance, and information exchange (Convention Against Corruption, 
2005). The standard definition of corruption comes from Transparency International, 
defined as "abuse of entrusted power for private gain." 13 
 In its traditional meaning, corruption is referred to as moral impurity, spoiled, or 
abuse of power (Holmes, 2015. p.1).  Rothstein argues that corruption can be defined as the 
antonym of impartiality (Rothstein, as cited in Sparling, 2017, p.377). Impartiality is 
understood as treating everybody in the same way and equally. Rothstein's definition of 
corruption is imperfect because he only considers the "output" of politics rather than 
"inputs." If officials cheat everyone equally, maintaining impartiality does not eliminate or 
prevent corruption.  For example, demanding the same amount of bribe from drivers who 
exceed the speed limit and violate the law does not make road police uncorrupt or fair. Thus, 
Rothstein's definition cannot be applied to every case as the definition of corruption.  
Svensson describes corruption as an outcome. According to him, corruption is a 
"reflection of a country's legal, economic, cultural and political institutions" (Svensson, 2005, 
p.20). Carnival states that corruption is a social network phenomenon that attacks the 
"exchange relationship" between individuals or units. He also adds that there are three 
elements of this "exchange," which are the direction of exchange (horizontal or vertical), 
exchanged resource type (money, power, information), and mode of exchange (formal or 
informal) (Carjaval, 1999, p.337). 
The main characteristics of corruption are listed as: 
1) Violation of duties or obligations is present in the act. 
2) Everybody (public or private position) can participate in corruption. 
3) A person who provokes corruption in another is also corrupt (Carjaval, 1999, 
p.339). 
Klitgaard notes that "Corruption exists in all countries. But the corruption tends to be 
more damaging to poor countries, where it can undermine property rights, the rule of law, 
 
13 See https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption accessed 20 June 2021. 
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and incentives to invest" (Klitgaard, 2000, p.4).  Svensson points out that being a developing 
or transition country, ruled by the socialist government, having low-income levels, and 
maintaining closed economies are the typical characteristics of the countries high in 
corruption (Svensson, 2005, p.24). Klitgaard also approaches corruption from a different 




He believes … “corruption flourishes when someone has monopoly power a good or service and 
has the discretion to decide how much you receive and where accountability and transparency are 
weak” (Klitgaard, 2011, p.33).  In his view, to reduce corruption, the government may consider 
supporting competition through different means such as government contracts. In addition, 
the rules of the game should be decided and explained to the public. For example, if a person 
wants to be recruited in civil service, the requirements and the overall process should be 
explained in a simple language that everyone can understand. People in power cannot use 
the lack of awareness of people in their favor. There are many methods suggested by 
Klitgaard related to increasing accountability. Methods include improving performance 
measurement, providing mechanisms for public complaints, and attracting outside agencies 
to monitor, control, and evaluate the organization (Klitgaard, 2011, p.34).  
 However, law scholar Matthew Stephenson finds this formula very dangerous and 
misleading. He believes the claims made by Klitgaard - reducing monopoly, tightening 
discretion, or increases accountability will decrease the corruption - might be valid under 
certain conditions, but not always, as Klitgaard argues (Stephenson, 2014). For example, 
fostering competition to reduce monopoly might hinder corruption but also trigger it. He 
C = M + D - A
Corruption (C) equals monopoly power (M) plus discretion of officials (D) 
minus accountability (A)
Figure 2 Klitgaard's corruption formula 
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brings examples from competition among jurisdiction which "… can lead them to compete 
to offer the most attractive opportunities for corruption" (Stephenson, 2014).14 
When studying, scholars classify corruption based on different factors, including scale 
and motivation. Corruption typology based on its scale seems rather prominent in the 
literature. According to this typology, corruption has two primary forms: petty and grand. 
Petty corruption involves a small sum of money and is seen as more tolerable than other 
corruption types. Petty corruption occurs in order “… to avoid fines and court summonses, 
ascend waiting lists, and secure preferential services” (Barr, Serra, 2009, p.489). In petty 
corruption, it is clear who is the seller and who is the buyer.  Usually, civil servants hold 
junior positions which benefit petty corruption the most (Riley, 1999, p.190). Petty corruption 
is considered 'white corruption' according to Heidenheimer typology of corruption based 
on moral acceptance. In his own words,  
"white corruption signifies that the majority of both elite and mass opinion 
probably would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that 
they regard as tolerable" (Heidenheimer, 2002, p.152).  
Bauhr further notes that it could be considered white corruption because everybody 
knows that you do it or acknowledges that you need to be engaged in it to get the services 
you are entitled to. However, it does not mean that petty corruption is white in every context; 
for example, in developed countries where corruption is very low, petty corruption is not 
tolerable (Bauhr,2012, p.70).  Uslaner states that people tolerate petty corruption because 
they do not see any other choice. After all, the political system does not work correctly 
without these "gifts," making petty corruption come close to the need for corruption 
(Uslaner, 2008, p,11). Riley also emphasized that since petty corruption does not influence 
the economy in the long term, it is often considered trivial (Riley, 1999, p.190).  
Transparency International defines “grand” corruption as “the abuse of high-level power 
that benefits the few at the expense of the many and causes serious and widespread harm to 
individuals and society. It often goes unpunished”.15 Arvind Jain explains grand corruption as 
 
14 See https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/05/27/klitgaards-misleading-corruption-formula/ accessed 
20 June 2021. 
15 Check https://www.transparency.org/en/corruptionary/grand-corruption accessed 20 June 2021. 
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“acts of the political elite by which they exploit their power to make economic policies” (Jain, 2001, 
p.73). In extreme cases, Jain believes grand corruption may lead to no distinction between 
the wealth of a dictator and the whole nation because the dictator exploits the country's 
resources and treats them as his own (Jain, 2001, p.74). This kind of corruption does not 
depend on individuals because the system itself is corrupted, and even the most virtuous 
man is forced to be corrupt if he wants to stay in the system (Mashali, 2012, p.777). Grand 
corruption highlights the system's characteristics, such as lack of transparency, lack of the 
rule of law, and regulations to prevent it.  Since it usually happens at top-level negotiations 
between political officials, the public is unaware of grand corruption. Disclosure of the 
grand corruption is very challenging, primarily because of threats and opposition (Mashali, 
2012, p.778).  Uslaner differentiates petty and grand corruption from the perspective of 
inequality. He considers grand corruption more influential to inequality since it involves 
more enormous sums of money than petty corruption (Uslaner, 2008, p.44). 
Scholars usually focus on the scale of corruption based on how widespread corruption 
is. However, Monika Bauhr comes up with a new classification of corruption. Her 
classification is based on the motivation behind engaging in corruption: need or greed 
(Bauhr, 2012, p.68). Need corruption occurs when citizens are asked to pay a bribe for the 
services they are officially entitled to, such as birth certificates or acquiring passports. It is 
also called systematic corruption. Bauhr further notes that the relationship between actors 
in need corruption is based on coercion and extortion. (Bauhr, 2012, p.68).  Greed corruption 
takes when a paying bribe is not entitled to services that he or she is paying for. Unlike need 
corruption, greed corruption is less visible, and the action's cost is divided among many 
actors. Both actors engaged in corruption enjoy benefits (Bauhr, 2012, p.68).   
  What corruption is and is not has always been discussed in the literature. Reviewing 
several definitions and the formula of corruption enables one to understand its scale and 
motives better. In Azerbaijan, both petty and grand, as well as need and greed, corruption 
are present. As will be discussed later, possible corruption cases in the SEC possesses both 
need and greed corruption. From the service user’s perspective, if s/he is asked to pay an 
additional amount for being provided by certificate upon successful test examination, then 
it is need corruption because you cannot get a public sector job if you do not go through the 
SEC. However, from the SEC’s side, this is greed corruption. By saying from the SEC’s side, 
I mean the individual who is employed at the SEC and acts on behalf of the organization. 
Because when people engage in corruption, they do not bribe the organization, but the 
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individuals who are working at the organization and have the authority over the services 
provided. This individual is likely to engage in corruption because of personal financial 
incentives.  However, if the service user initiates the corruption, then it is merely greed 
corruption from both sides. Considering the scale of possible corruption activities 
happening in the test examination or interview stage, it is more appropriate to define it as 
petty corruption since it is improbable to involve higher sums of money.  
 
3.2 What affects perception of corruption? 
Corruption studies not always focus on societies or institutions but also on people 
individually. The absence of a unique definition of corruption makes it harder for 
researchers to study what influences corruption perception (Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, 
p.184).  Melgar, Rossi, and Smith believe that the perceived level of corruption varies as 
everybody acknowledges or understands corruption differently. They find out that "… some 
socio-demographic variables are significant determinants of the perceived level of corruption" 
(Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, p.184). They further argue that assuming that people are rational 
actors who calculate the costs and benefits of their actions, perception of the corruption will 
change according to their moral values and beliefs (Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, p.184). For 
some, financial interest may weigh more than being ethical or vice versa. Depending on 
people's moral values and beliefs, they have different approaches to corruption, thus 
different perceptions of corruption. In their research, Melgar, Rossi, and Smith argue that 
there might be some predictors of corruption perception and conclude that gender, marital 
status, educational level, and employment sector do influence the corruption perception 
(Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, p.192). Specifically, women possess a higher corruption 
perception than men (see below for discussion). In addition, divorced people are prone to 
perceive higher corruption than married ones; however, they did not elaborate on the 
reasons for that relationship. They also note that private-sector employees perceive a higher 
level of corruption than those employed in the public sector (Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, 
p.192). They claim that people who are on the "demand" side of the "bribe market" are more 
likely to perceive a lower level of corruption than people in the "supply" side of the "bribe 
market" (Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, p.192). Educated people (completed at least secondary 
education) tend to perceive a lower level of corruption. Melgar and his colleagues relate this 
to the fact that educated people have more capability to process information (Melgar, Rossi, 
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Smith, 2010, p.192). In other words, educated people can assess corruption and differentiate 
it from other kinds of payments such as service fees. Torgler and Valev also add that higher 
educated people may know more about the government's activities and performances and 
evaluate corruption from this perspective. However, they also argue that educated people 
may well be engaged in corruption more because they are more aware of the corruption 
opportunities (Torgler, Valev, 2006, p.138).   
Several studies, including "Are women really the "fairer sex? Corruption and women in 
government" and "The influence of Socioeconomic Trends and Experiences on Individual 
Perception of Corruption," were carried out on the relationship between gender and 
corruption perception. In the first research, Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti conclude that women 
are less likely to sacrifice the common good for private gains and more likely to perceive 
higher corruption. Thus, countries with higher women representation in government tend 
to have a lower perception of corruption (Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001 p.424). The second 
study by Zakaria explains why women perceive more corruption than men. They mention 
two reasons: the first, being more active in the labor market results in witnessing bribery or 
asking to pay bribery, leading them to perceive corruption higher than men. The second 
possible explanation is increased participation in government and closer observation of 
corruption (Zakaria, 2016, p.433). Torgler and Valev also point out that "… being female rather 
than male increase the probability of a person stating that a bribe is never justifiable" (Torgler, 
Valev, 2006, p.142).  To conclude, a male is more tolerant to corruption; thus, they perceive 
less corruption. 
Age is another demographic determinant of corruption perception. Even though 
Melgar, Rossi, and Smith reveal no significant difference among the corruption perception 
of different age groups (Melgar, Rossi & Smith, 2010, p.187). In "Corruption and Age," Torgler 
and Valev look at how age affects the justifiability of corruption. They conclude that the age 
of the person and his view on the justifiability of the corruption has a negative correlation 
because, as individual ages, s/he becomes more compliant with rules and regulations 
(Torgler & Valev, 2006, p.142).  
In sum, there might be several predictors of corruption perception, such as gender, age, 
marital status, education level, and employment status. For example, researchers conclude 
that women perceive higher corruption than men as married people compared to single 
people. Moreover, educated people are more prone to perceive a lower level of corruption 
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than people who have not finished secondary school. They also determine that private-
sector employees are more likely to have higher corruption perceptions than their 
counterparts in the public sector. However, age is found not to affect changes in corruption 
perception associated with different age groups among all these predictors.   
 
3.3 Situation in Azerbaijan 
This section demonstrates scholars' and researchers' scientific works related to the 
political system in Azerbaijan, the SEC. Unfortunately, we have a minimal understanding 
of how people perceive corruption in the SEC. Moreover, finding literature specifically for 
the SEC is a challenge because it is a newly established entity. Given that there is only one 
study on SEC16, I will first present how the situation is in Azerbaijan concerning corruption 
is presented in reports by think tanks and international organizations. Afterward, few 
scholarly articles will be reviewed on the issue of corruption in Azerbaijan.  
 
 
16 Karimov, E. (2018). Can an Authoritarian Regime Have a Meritocratic Public Administration? The Case of 
Azerbaijan. CAAF Fellows Paper. 
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Since 1995 CPI has been scaling and scoring countries based on how experts and 
business executives perceive corruption in the country's public sector. Transparency 
International's Corruption Perception Index has some criticism; one is very explicit in the 
name. CPI measures perception, not the real, reported cases of proven incidences of 
corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009, p.752). If a person believes that everyone around 
him is engaging in corrupt activities, then s/he adapts to this environment and is more likely 
to perceive less corruption. The second problem with CPI is not knowing what participants 
of the surveys understand by corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009, p.753). Despite these 
criticisms, it is still beneficial for academic research, especially when conducting macro-
oriented research (Andersson & Heywood, 2009, p.755). World Bank Enterprise Survey 2013 
focusing on Azerbaijan stated that public officials' corruption is a strain on private firms 
because they need to pay "unofficial" and unlawful price to public officials for administrative 
and regulatory processes like registering the firm tax payments securing a government 
contract. Bribery for licenses and permits is also common (World Bank Group, 2014, p.9). 
(For more indicators, see Figure 3).17 
At the moment, Azerbaijani public administration cannot be defined as a system 
based on meritocracy. The patron-client system seems a more suitable description of the 
current system, according to Karimov (2018, p.1). The ruling regime (patron) shares power 
among certain people (clients) to manipulate activities in the country. Clients who received 
"informal" authority from patron are subject to special protection and advantages, which, in 
turn, propagates corruption. Thus, the political system in Azerbaijan does not reflect the 
choices of its population but the patron-client network (Guliyev, 2012, p.118).  It is noteworthy 
to mention that both in 2012 and 2018, two different scholars, Guliyev and Karimov, describe 
the system in Azerbaijan as corrupted.  
Another study is by Hannes Meissner, which focuses on informal political patterns 
in Azerbaijan. In the article, the author traces the corrupt structures and practices 
frequently utilized by public officials. Specifically, he draws attention to client networks and 
corruption practices in Azerbaijan. At the end of the article, he concludes that "Much of the 
 
17 Azerbaijani Country Profile taken from Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (p.7) by M. Bak, 2020, U4 Anti-corruption Helpdesk 
https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/kproducts/Regional-profile-Eastern-Partnership-
countries_2020_PR.pdf accessed 20 June 2021. 
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public sector is corrupt, as demonstrated by the sale of public posts and the illegal demands for money 
from the population in exchange for public services" (Meissner, 2011, p.9). He further claims that 
corruption is considered an everyday activity in Azerbaijan: "To ensure a steady source of 
income, the ruling regime draws on corrupt networks pervading state and society since Soviet times" 
(Meissner, 2011, p. 7). Meissner claims that there are established pricelists for the post in the 
administration, the education, the army, and many other sectors. Paying several hundred 
thousand dollars for a position in the pyramid is an investment for what they will gain 
through bribes in the future (Meissner, 2011, p. 7).   
As mentioned in 2. Context of the study chapter, Azerbaijan’s civil service 
recruitment is divided into two - specialized and general, and they both have a different 
process for getting employed in the public sector. General recruitment includes written 
competition and interview. However, the decision of whom to hire depends on the head of 
the state body, which enables an opportunity for corruption. Specialized recruitment is 
conducted internally by the state body, and there is no third-party monitoring of how the 
recruitment is organized. According to Meissner (2011), selling the positions for high sums 
of money more likely happens with the positions in state bodies with specialized 
recruitment and supreme-3rd classes of administrative positions in the supreme category of 
state bodies. To conclude, the civil service recruitment in Azerbaijan does not entirely 
belong to the SEC, as the aforementioned state bodies fall outside of the SEC's duty scope. 
Given that Meissner conducted his study in 2011, studying the SEC and whether it is 
perceived as an island of integrity or not will enable him to check his argument and assess 
if the positions filled by open competition are prone to be sold. 
 Elchin Karimov's "Can an Authoritarian Regime Have a Meritocratic Public 
Administration? The Case of Azerbaijan" may be the most relevant source for this study. He 
underlines the importance of institutionalization of meritocracy, which, according to him, 
seems absent in Azerbaijan. Both independent civil society organizations and autonomous 
parliament are missing to monitor bureaucrats' work (Karimov, 2018, p.7). This would mean 
that there is no accountability mechanism exists. In the article, Karimov remarks few 
suggestions to the SEC and Central Government of Azerbaijan to improve Azerbaijan's 
public administration. Instead, he recommends that the SEC conduct a study exploring the 
reasons behind the unwillingness of contact-based employees who are working 
impermanently in civil service positions to apply for becoming civil servants in open 
competition because this might help to increase the reputation of civil service (Karimov, 
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2018, p.11). Furthermore, he suggests that the Central Government of Azerbaijan increase 
the monthly salary of low and mid-level civil servants because without paying adequate 
salaries, it is tough to eliminate bribery. He expects that this will also prevent the lure of 
corruption, likewise attract and encourage qualified civil servants to remain in their 
positions and not switch to private-sector employment that offers higher salaries (Karimov, 
2018, p.11).  However, increasing salaries may only help prevent "petty corruption’’ not the 
“grand corruption.” Given that in Azerbaijan, salaries of civil servants are comparatively 
low, it is likely that civil servants engage in corruption because they cannot meet the 
minimum standard of living with their official salaries; thus, they need an additional source 
of income from bribes.  Karimov notes that in 2016 the average monthly salary for civil 
servants was approximately 373 USD, and to cover the expenses of a four-person family, at 
least 1389 USD is needed, which also excludes the rent (Karimov, 2018, p.6). It is visible that 
civil servants might fail to resist lucrative offers. Bribes involve a small amount of money 
but happen frequently. If a civil servant gets enough salary to maintain his/her living 
standards, their dependence and need for bribe also decrease, resulting in an overall 
decrease in corruption. On the other hand, we know that grand corruption occurs less 
frequently and involves a very big sum of money. Grand corruption happens not because of 
the need but greed. Thus, even increasing salaries will not affect to change the greed of the 
public officials. In addition, Karimov proposes sending the best senior bureaucrats to 
universities abroad to earn their degrees with the condition of returning to the country and 
working for the government for five years and, bringing change after learning best practices 
abroad. Another suggestion to the government is to create an independent accountability 
inspection within each state body to monitor its activities and evaluate its performance. 
Thus, it will benefit the state to achieve development agenda and push out incompetent civil 
servants. 
  Recalling Klitgaard's formula (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - 
Accountability), government officials and civil servants in higher positions in the 
administration have a monopoly over the resources in Azerbaijan. Not having competition 
in the services creates suitable conditions for corruption to flourish. On top of that, 
government officials also have extensive discretionary powers, such as recruiting civil 
servants to higher positions in the administration. Effective law enforcement, separation of 
power, independent judiciary is needed in Azerbaijan to decrease government officials' 
discretion. However, the political system in Azerbaijan is dominated by mighty executive 
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power and law enforcement agencies which are considered unaccountable because of weak 
surveillance (McDevitt, 2015, p.18). Since the dominant executive controls the judiciary's 
budget, Azerbaijan also lacks an independent judiciary to oversee activities of executive 
power. To ensure accountability, there should be a free press, civic organizations, 
independent auditing. However, the Azerbaijani government had experience with arresting 
and imprisoning political activists, journalists, and lawyers with bogus charges (McDevitt, 
2015, p.18).  Thus, establishing independent accountability inspection might affect state 
bodies that have a monopoly over public services.  
Karimov emphasizes the significance of using e-governance tools to fight corruption 
too. He offers explicitly to develop a complete online form on the SEC or Commission on 
Combating Corruption website to collect complaints from citizens fast and effectively. He 
highlights the importance of raising awareness among the population to report any 
experience with civil servant's misuse of their power. Lastly, he reminds that all these 
suggestions or possible reforms will do no positive change to curb corruption if the political 
will is absent. He believes that these suggestions may positively impact corruption only if 
political elites favor curbing corruption. If not, "creating a centralized exam to recruit 
meritorious civil servants will alone do nothing to fight corruption in the civil service" (Karimov, 
2018, p.11).   It means that even though the SEC manages to prevent corruption in its activities 
and provide meritorious civil servants, it will not eliminate the corruption in the whole 
public administration.  Karimov’s statement also implies that it is possible to have a corrupt-
free or corrupt to an extend organization in a corrupt system. 
 Azerbaijan's reputation for corruption is not so optimistic, according to international 
organizations and think tanks. Different scholars in different years agree that the public 
administration of Azerbaijan does not base on meritocratic principles but patron-client 
networks. Even though the SEC organizes recruitment based on competition, several 
problematic instances question the meritocratic principles in recruitment. One of them is 
selling high positions in the administration; in that case, specialized recruitment of several 
state bodies is relevant. As mentioned earlier in 2.3. Opportunities for corruption direct 
promotions or appointments to high positions in the public administration without any 
competitive recruitment brings doubts about transparency and fairness to the minds. 
Another one is the discretion of state bodies discretion in deciding whom to recruit at the 
last stage.  Head of the state body does not have any obligation to justify the recruitment 
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decision. The following section will offer a theoretical framework that will help understand 
how the users and experts perceive this. 
 
3.4 Theoretical Framework 
This part is organized based on the flow of the research questions. It starts with the 
corruption definition/perception by service users, followed by a discussion on user’s 
individual level of characteristics and the SEC's organizational-level characteristics.  
This thesis focuses on the SEC, seeking to understand how service users and experts 
perceive corruption. Given that there is no clear-cut definition of corruption for this thesis, 
I will use the one suggested by Transparency International, which is "misuse of entrusted 
power for private gain." Thus, any possible corruption activities in civil service recruitment, 
either by the SEC or other state bodies, is  misuse of the entrusted power for illicit aims and 
gains. 
  Because corruption is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan's public administration, 
different kinds of corruption, including petty, grand, need, and greed corruption, are likely 
to be present. To investigate the corruption perception, first, we should know what kind of 
corruption is involved in civil service recruitment. Assuming that a candidate might offer a 
bribe or ask for a bribe to gain an unfair advantage in the exam or interview process, it is 
defined as petty corruption because it likely does not involve high amounts of money. It is 
improbable for a candidate to pay a higher amount for a public position with a decent salary 
because it is not a profitable investment. As Meissner claims, public officials or higher civil 
servants opt for “buying” positions in the system because they will compensate it with the 
bribes coming from provisions of goods and services in the future. From the perspective of 
the SEC, if exam inspectors engage in corruption and accept the payment to ignore cheating 
or usage of electronic devices, it is petty corruption. S/he does not have high-level political 
power but will still be engaged in petty corruption in this case. On top of it, inspectors in the 
test examination are not always the same, so it is not always the same person who can take 
bribes all the time. 
On the other hand, at the very end of the recruitment process, if the head of the 
recruiting state body misuses his/her power and prefers one candidate over another merely 
because of any personal benefits, it might well fit the definition of grand corruption and 
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petty corruption at the same time depending on the amount of money and conditions on a 
bribe. If it is a relatively small amount, then it is likely to be petty; however, if it involves big 
amounts and promises, then it may well be considered as grand corruption as well.  It is also 
applicable to the instances where the recruitment is carried out outside the scope of SEC's 
duties within recruiting state body's specialized recruitment process. Since there is no 
oversight mechanism to recruiting positions that do not proceed to open competition, it is 
very likely for the head of state bodies to use their discretion to engage in grand corruption, 
as Meissner claimed.  
 Given that potential corruption activities in civil service recruitment can both be 
petty and grand depending on which perspective to look, the motive behind the corruption 
is also debatable. For example, suppose everyone is asked to pay an additional amount 
(alongside payment for registering for the exam) to take and pass the test examination or 
interview stage successfully. In that case, it is need corruption because, legally, everyone has 
the right to apply for civil service, and conditioning the provision of legal rights requires 
corruption. However, need corruption is applicable only from the candidate's perspective. 
We can find greed motives in possible corrupt activities related to the recruitment as well if 
the service user initiates the offer. In other words, a person who lacks the knowledge or 
qualifications but wants to become a civil servant might offer money to pass the written test 
and/or interview. In times of powerful social media, it is relatively easier to raise an issue 
and complaint; however, it is very tough to find a complain related to the unfairness of the 
SEC in its activities. It might be due to the open competition (test examination), which is 
supposed to be transparent so that qualified individuals can proceed without engaging in 
corruption. I emphasize only the test examination because the SEC is the only actor in 
conducting the test examination. There is no third-party state body engaging in. Possible 
corruption cases that occurred in the civil service recruitment might consist of need as well 
as greed corruption. It is dichotomous.  
Given that Azerbaijan is a country with an authoritarian regime and good governance 
practices are not entirely in place, petty corruption is needed to "grease" the process when 
bureaucracy is not working correctly.  “A central theme of the grease-the-wheels argument 
was that corrupt acts such as bribery could be an efficient way of getting around 
burdensome regulations and ineffective legal systems” (Holmberg et al., 2014, p.260). When 
exhausting paperwork involves in the provision of service, bribery also contains "need 
motive." People need to pay a bribe, which is also called speed money in this context, to 
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enhance efficiency and get the services in a considerable time frame (Holmberg et al., 2014, 
p.261). 
Regarding corruption perception, I expect specific demographic characteristics to have 
an impact on corruption perception in general.  Recalling the studies of Melgar, Rossi, and 
Smith (2010), Torgler and Valev (2006), and Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (2001), this might be 
gender, age, marital status, education level, and employment sector. Therefore, even though 
this study is qualitative, mentioned demographic characteristics are considered conditions 
while the corruption perception is the outcome.  
The respondents of this study will be university graduates, so they will have higher 
education (higher education is a requirement for civil service). As mentioned in the 
literature review, educated people may perceive a lower level of corruption than 
uneducated ones because they have more capabilities to process information related to 
corruption. If the results imply that interviewees perceive a higher level of corruption in the 
SEC, other people are more likely to perceive even more. 
Apart from analyzing perceptions of corruption using individual-level characteristics of 
users (demographic characteristics), the study also explores organizational-level 
characteristics. The study participants are also asked to compare the SEC with the rest of 
the public administration.   
Among the different drivers of corruption, I choose Klitgaard's corruption formula as 
one of the ways to understand the organizational level aspects of why the SEC might be 
considered less corrupt than the rest of the system.  Klitgaard explains his corruption 
formula as 
"Whether the activity is public, private or nonprofit, and whether it is carried on 
in Ouagadougou or Washington, one will tend to find corruption when an 
organization or person has monopoly power over a good or service, has the discretion 
to decide who will receive it and how much that person will get and is not accountable" 
(Klitgaard, 1998, p.4). 
Albeit it has some critics, the corruption formula creates a ground to approach 
corruption from a different standpoint. It does not reflect on size or the motive. However, it 
allows to analyze the different aspects of corruption-related issues and predict some 
expectations. Klitgaard claims that corruption flourishes when monopoly and discretion are 
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available with the absence of accountability.  Whereas most civil servants are employed 
through the SEC's recruitment, it does not have an absolute monopoly overfilling the post 
in public administration. Several significant state bodies such as Defense, Tax, Internal 
Affairs, and Customs do not employ the SEC to conduct the recruitment. Instead, they have 
their internal recruitment system. The SEC has no power to participate or oversight.  
According to the Charter, the SEC is independent in its activities, and decisions are made in 
board meetings with the majority vote. Thus, it has discretion over its activities, but the rules 
define this discretion. There are two specific documents, “Procedure for conducting an 
interview for the purpose of holding a civil service position”18 and “Rules for preparation, 
examination, approval of test samples for admission to the civil service, continuation of 
activity in civil service and holding of civil service positions”19 related to how to organize and 
plan written test examination and interview stage which clearly defines all the steps in the 
recruitment.   However, one instance, deciding on whom to hire among successful 
candidates, is left outside the SEC's authority. The head of the state body is the authorized 
one to select any individual from the shortlisted candidate to employ without providing any 
justification. When analyzing the documents related to the rules on written examination 
and interview, as well as the Charter of the SEC, we see that most of the processes are very 
well defined, and there is not much room left for discretion.  
To conclude, the SEC has neither absolute monopoly over employing public servants in 
all positions nor over deciding whom to recruit at the end. Nevertheless, the SEC still 
maintains high monopoly, if not absolute. At the same time, there is very limited discretion 
and the SEC is only accountable to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and must 
regularly report its performance and activities which, arguably, is not a robust 
accountability mechanism.  To increase transparency and accountability, the board of 
directors, which is the managing body of the SEC, includes outsiders such as the Minister of 
Education, Head of the Institute of Management Systems, and so on. Furthermore, on the 
 
18 See the law on Procedure for conducting an interview for the purpose of holding a civil service position. 
http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/35861 accessed 26 June 2021. 
19 See the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers on Rules for preparation, examination, approval of test samples 
for admission to the civil service, continuation of activity in civil service and holding of civil service positions.  
http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/35054 accessed 26 June, 2021.  
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SEC website, one can easily find the reports on civil service recruitment which consists of 
statistical information. 20  
Recalling Klitgaard's formula of corruption (Corruption= Monopoly + Discretion- 
Accountability), we see high monopoly, low discretion, and low accountability. If we follow 
Klitgaard's formula, we expect the SEC to be neither entirely corrupt nor corrupt-free, but 
rather somewhere in between. However, according to anecdotal evidence, it is perceived as 
the other way around. This exciting issue will be the focus of the expert interviews, which 
will specifically focus on their understanding of organizational-level conditions.   
 
 
20 See https://eservices.dim.gov.az/dqq/DQreports accessed 20 June 2021. 
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IV. Research Design and Methodology  
The research design is "a logical plan for getting from here to there, where here may be defined 
as the initial set of questions to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about 
these questions" (Yin, 2009, p.26). The research is a case study of the SEC using a qualitative 
approach. A case study is a helpful strategy to explore a program, event, activity, process, or 
individual in detail (Creswell, p.30). An in-depth analysis of the case study provides readers 
an adequate basis for concluding results from the research. This is one of the most used 
social research methods, especially when "why" and "how" questions are chosen (Creswell, 
2009, p.32). Yin also notes the valuable contribution of case studies to literature about the 
knowledge of the individual, organizational, social, or political phenomenon, especially 
complex ones (Yin, 2014, p.4).  
 
4.1 Case selection and methodological approach  
Trent and Cho state that  
"typically, qualitative researchers begin with a starting point-a curiosity, a 
problem in need of solutions, research questions, and a desire to understand better a 
situation from the native perspectives of the individuals who inhabit that context 
(Trent & Cho, 2020, p.957). 
 In this study, the starting point was the anecdotal evidence related to the SEC. It 
suggests that candidates can take exams and apply for civil service recruitment without 
paying for bribery. It was surprising to hear that the SEC appeared corrupt-free or corrupt 
to a small extent in a corrupt environment my attention to exploring what reasons are 
behind this. 
Interestingly, as a slightly deviant case it is working against the Klitgaards' formula.  "A 
deviant case study is a research design or case selection technique for refining or replacing an existing 
theory or hypothesis" (Levy, 2010, p.3). Levy adds that deviant case studies explain the cases 
that do not meet the theoretical predictions (Levy, 2010, p.5). Looking at the SEC from the 
outside, we see that it has quite a high monopoly, minimal accountability, and high 
discretion in decision-making in the interview stage (written examinations are fully 
regulated). It is not an absolute deviant case, but considering organizational-level 
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characteristics, the SEC does not behave as expected; it would be perceived at least to some 
extend corrupt.  
 When we apply the formula to the SEC, two out of three elements, namely, a relatively 
high monopoly and minimal accountability, hints at the expectation that the SEC not being 
corrupt-free or corrupt to a small extend. However, still, this public agency is considered 
almost not corrupt at all in the context that overall considered as corrupt. This is due to the 
third element, discretion, and in the SEC’s case, it is very low. Low discretion changes the 
expectations related to corruption in the SEC, and assumingly, the SEC should be not-fully 
corrupt. 
The qualitative research method is utilized in this study to address the research 
questions mentioned above. As Creswell notes, the qualitative method involves non-
numerical data analysis to understand a social phenomenon (Creswell, 2009, p.31). The 
study employs semi-structured interviews to collect social and personal data related to the 
issue under study. Semi-structured interviews "…  are generally organized around a set of 
predetermined open-ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue between 
interviewer and interviewee/s" (DiCacco-Bloom, & Crabtree, 2006, p.315). It is also the most 
used in human and social sciences (Brinkmann, 2020, p.437). This data collection method is 
famous for various reasons, including being versatile and flexible, enabling the researcher 
to adapt questions based on the answers by the interviewee (Kallio, Pietilä, Johnson, & 
Kangasniemi, 2016 p.2955).  It also enables  
“… the better use of the knowledge-producing potential of dialogues by allowing 
much more leeway for following up on whatever angles are deemed important by the 
interviewee; as well, the interviewer has a greater chance of becoming visible as a 
knowledge-producing participant in the process itself, rather than hiding behind a 
preset interview guide" (Brinkmann, 2020, p.437).  
What attracts me to use semi-structured interviews is that they allow understanding 
respondents' views better than surveys or questionaries in quantitative studies. Open-ended 
questions leave room for creativity during the interview based on the researcher's answers 
and explore what is more relevant for the study. Of course, there are also some 
disadvantages of the interviews. Creswell, for example, states that gathered data is subject 
to filtering by interviewees. It means that the researcher can only get what the interviewee 
wants to share from their experience. Besides, poor recollection by the respondent is also a 
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constrain. Respondents may provide incorrect answers, especially if s/he had the experience 
many years ago. Another limitation is that respondents may give biased answers because of 
the researcher's presence, especially when it comes to sensitive topics such as corruption 
(Creswell, 2009, p.167). Giving out unconscious signals or leading questions to excepted 
answers is another disadvantage. 
 The outcome of interest in this study is the users' and experts' perceived level of 
corruption of the SEC, relying on data gained from semi-structured interviews.  Specifically, 
the interviews focus on experiences and perceptions of the service users of the SEC and 
experts regarding the extent of corruption in the civil service recruitment context. The 
format of the interviews was online because the Covid-19 related travel restrictions limited 
the possibility of face-to-face interviews. The interviewees were the people who took the 
exam in the SEC and the experts.  
The conditions of interest in this study are individual-level conditions (demographic 
characteristics of users) and organizational-level conditions (monopoly, discretion, and 
accountability).21 Some of the information on demographic characteristics such as gender 
and age are gained through the data provided by the SEC, and the researcher asked the rest 
(education level, marital status, and employment sector) in the interview. Interviewing 
experts was a valuable source of data, especially related to organizational level conditions, 
complemented by document analysis, specifically SEC Constitution and Charter). These 
documents contain the rules of preparation, approval of test samples for admission to civil 
service, and rules for conducting interviews, and are beneficial to understand which 
measures are taken in the SEC to prevent corruption. However, not everything happens 
exactly how it is described in the documents.  Thus, I mainly used these documents to 
understand the organizational characteristics of the SEC. Documents help to understand 
how much monopoly, discretion, and accountability it possesses.  
4.2 Recruiting interviewees 
Qualitative sampling demands the identifying suitable participants who can contribute 
to the research the most (Creswell, 2009, p.166). The first target for the interviews was people 
who have experience with the SEC. Since they have direct experience with the SEC, they 
can provide valuable insights about how transparent and fair the recruitment process is and 
21 It is worth mentioning that conditions would be labeled as independent variables and outcomes as dependent 
variables if quantitative research were used. 
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in what instances corruption may erupt. On the SEC's website, there were few exam takers' 
statistic data on specific exam dates. To have more comprehensive data, I contacted the SEC 
and briefly informed them about the purpose of my study. Even though the corruption-
related study is considered a sensitive issue in Azerbaijan, they were kind enough to 
contribute to my study by providing the data I need. They sent me the list of candidates who 
took the test exam, passed the test examination, and proceeded to the interview stage, and 
who passed the interview stage and were eventually recruited. The list also included the 
gender and birthdate of the candidates, which allows them to know their ages (all 
demographics are described in Figure 4). To contact them, I also received their emails. One 
drawback of the data set was not including the information about the people who failed the 
test examination that left me no data about the first group of interviewees explained below.  
From the SEC dataset, I planned to have around 12 interviewees based on three 
categories: 
1) Candidates who took the test exam and failed, 
2) Candidates who passed the test exam and failed interview, 
3) Candidates who were successful on both stages and recruited. 
When selecting interviewees, the criterion included diversity regarding participants' 
gender and age to eliminate possible biases. It also allowed to compare and contrast their 
responses based on these characteristics and answer exciting questions such as how 
different a woman in her 30s working in the public sector perceive corruption in the SEC 
than her male counterpart. 
After registering this study with the NSD, I pre-selected possible interviewees for the 2nd 
and third groups from the dataset. I contacted them over email, in which I explained the 
purpose of the study and that the data will be anonymized. With a few days' gaps, I sent 
emails to more than 100 individuals who took the SEC exam; however, given that corruption 
is a sensitive topic, turnout to these emails was low. I ended up interviewing only nine 
people from two categories together (people who passed the written examination but failed 




Recruiting the participants for the first group was especially tricky since there was no 
list provided. Thus, I designed a post that included the name and the purpose of the study 
and requirements for being respondents. I posted it on different Facebook groups, including 
university alumni groups and groups created for preparation for civil service recruitment. 
However, nobody agreed to participate, and due to practical constraints and availability of 
the interviewees, I had nine people agreed to be interviewed in total. Service users of the 
SEC who were willing to interview me were given few options for a scheduling time slot. 
Due to several public holidays and time zone differences between Norway and Azerbaijan 
data collection process took longer than expected. Interviewing service users through Zoom 
meetings took about 3 months. 
Another limitation during the recruitment was that people who are more than 40 years 
old either took the test before establishing the SEC or worked in the civil service for more 
than 5 years. They are not engaged in test examination. Thus, I only had one interviewee 
over 40 years old. 
Table 2 Demographic characteristics of service users 
Demographics of the Service Users
Gender Age Education level Marital Status Sector
1 woman 42 bachelor married public
2 woman 34 bachelor married public
3 woman 33 bachelor married public
4 woman 27 master single public (not rec)
5 woman 25 bachelor married not working
6 woman 25 master single public
7  man 32 master married public
8 man 30 master married business
9 man 26 bachelor single public
 41 
 
The second target of the interviews was the experts, who have more profound 
knowledge than service users to detect and analyze possible corruption cases. While 
interviews with service users provide valuable primary information related to corruption 
perception in the SEC and the influence of demographic characteristics on that perception, 
expert interviews help investigate the SEC’s organizational characteristics. Recruitment of 
experts (See Figure 5) started with looking at the website of Transparency International in 
Azerbaijan website. I planned to involve one expert from Transparency International's 
Azerbaijan office, who also participates in the interview stage as an independent expert, 
another expert on civil service who also participates in the interview stage on behalf of the 
SEC, and, lastly, one independent expert. Fortunately, Transparency International's 
Azerbaijan office agreed to arrange an interview with a member expert from leadership. He 
also provided me necessary contact info with an independent expert and expert working in 
the SEC. A separate information email was sent to the SEC in order to have permission for 
interviewing its expert. They also agreed to arrange an interview. Moreover, the third expert 
on corruption, who was working at Transparency International's Azerbaijan office for a long 




The rationale behind my expert selection was diversity in terms of their relationship 
with the SEC. Transparency International has a "watchdog" function to fight against 
corruption. I expected expert from TI to provide valuable information without concealing 
Table 3 Characteristics of the experts 
Recruited exper ts Their exper tise Relationship with   the SEC
Expert 1 Corruption Engages in the interview process
Expert 2 Corruption No relationship
Expert 3 Civil Service Works at the SEC
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anything because it is his professional duty to reveal and fight against corruption. Given that 
he also participates in the interview stage of the recruitment, he would present primary data 
about how fair and transparent the interviews are. I also purposefully selected one expert 
who has a direct relationship with the SEC because I wanted insights into how the SEC itself 
assesses the corruption perception and answers the questions related to corruption 
opportunities and the preventive measures against it. Finally, one independent expert who 
does not participate in the interview stage and does not have any professional duty to the 
SEC nor Transparency International would add value to the quality of the research because 
she is in a neutral position to the SEC.  She would not be so interested in exaggerating the 
situation as if it is her duty to reveal corruption cases or concealing any instances that are 
prone to corruption as if she has a duty to the SEC.  
 
4.3 Interview design and pilot interview 
While preparing the interview guide, research questions were my main focus. I tried to 
construct questions that will enable interviewees to provide me with valuable answers. The 
first section of the guide (See Appendix 3) is dedicated to the consent form and 
demographics of the interviewee. After that come warm-up questions. These questions 
served to prepare the interviewees for corruption-related questions, as well as to measure 
how much they know about corruption. Especially, the definition of corruption is asked 
because we need to be on the same page when specific questions are asked related to 
possible corruption activities in the SEC. One of the questions belongs to the justifiability of 
corruption, which should contribute to understanding the relationship between the 
respondents' demographic characteristics and corruption perception. Warm-up questions 
were followed by questions about their experience in the SEC. These questions were the 
most crucial ones to determine how service users perceive corruption in the SEC and what 
brings them to this perception. The interview guide also included corruption perception of 
public administration and locating the SEC in corruption activities. That shed light on 
whether the SEC is perceived as less corrupt than the rest of the administration; or is no 
different. The last section is devoted to their own experience with corruption, and it will 
enable me to understand the relationship between corruption experience and perception. 
Questions addressed to the experts were almost the same as the ones to the service users. 
I excluded the questions related to experience in the examination and interview stage from 
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the user's perspective but asked whether they have done any research on the SEC 
specifically. 
A pilot interview was arranged with a person who has successfully passed all the 
necessary recruitment for civil service. It should be noted that this person is the only one 
that I closely know; with the rest of the interviewees, I do not have any personal connections 
to ensure there are no compromises in the disclosure of the data after. The pilot interview 
helped me to get prepared for actual interviews better in terms of ensuring an uninterrupted 
process, increasing confidence about the question, and time management.  I translated the 
interview guide to Azerbaijani because I wanted to ensure a smooth interview without any 
interruptions due to translating. Secondly, when the pilot interview was done, I asked my 
interviewee whether the questions were sensitive. Knowing that my questions were not "too 
much" to ask encouraged me to formulate follow-up questions when needed.  Lastly, it gave 
me an idea of how long the interview lasts to mention it when contacting the study 
participant.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
Data collected in qualitative research is unstructured and unwieldy. According to 
Ritchie and Spencer, the data in qualitative research consists of text obtained from 
interviews or discussions, field notes, and other written documents (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994, 
p.176).  Thus, the researcher needs to structure what s/he gathers for analyzing and driving 
conclusions. Even though the process is presented as a hierarchy, as Creswell agrees, the 
different parts are interrelated (Creswell, 2009, p.171). The process starts with raw data. In 
this research, raw data are the transcript of the recorded interviews. After each interview, I 
listened to the recording and transcribed it into the document. Each interview transcript has 
a heading of the interview code, signing the demographics such as "32manrecmarmas," 
which stands for 32 years old man, married, recruited in the public sector, and holds a 
master's degree.  I also wrote the impression after each interview when my memory is still 
fresh. It helps to understand the overall tone of the interview and ease the analysis process. 
Johnny Saldanã calls it analytic memos. 
A coding process followed this. Creswell describes that process as "segmenting sentences 
(or paragraphs) or images into categories and labeling those categories with a term" 
(Creswell, 2009., p.173). I hand-coded the transcript even though it was a bit time-consuming 
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than equipping qualitative computer software programs to code and organize. The reason 
behind this choice was simple: there are no computer software programs that can help with 
text in Azerbaijani. The coding process in this thesis started with highlighting important 
segments with colors in the transcript then clustering them into different groups. Different 
colors stand for different codes. Examples of the codes that this research contains are "high 
perception," "low perception," similarly "high tolerance," "low tolerance," and so on.  
According to Saldanã, "these codes function as a way of patterning, classifying, and later 
reorganizing them into emergent categories for further analysis” (Saldaña, 2020, p.882). After that, 
I read the segments that cut from the transcript once more and gave them general headlines, 
eventually becoming the "themes" described in Creswell's illustration of Data Analysis in 
Qualitative Research. These themes included "CD" (Corruption Definition), "CA" 
(Corruption in Azerbaijan), CSEC (Corruption in the SEC), "CT" (Corruption Tolerance). 
Comprehensive information about each of these themes and will be given later in this 
section.  
Finally, the last step in this process is interpretation. Alan Peshkin writes that 
 "an interpretation is to show the way a researcher’s self, or identify in a situation, 
intertwines with his or her understanding of the object of the investigation” (Peshkin, 
2000, p.5). It is asking, “… what were the lessons learned?” (Creswell, 2009, p.175).  
If there is no interpretation presented in the study, then the study merely performs the 
descriptive role. Some argue that it is the researcher's duty to add understanding, 
interpretation, and meaning (Trent & Cho, 2020, p.960). Interpretation does not have to start 
after data analysis; it may even start early when documents are analyzed, interviews are 
conducted, and data is gathered (Fossey, Harvey, McDermott, Davidson, 2002, p.729). The 
analysis of different documents and reports, first impressions from the interviews of both 
service users and experts already drafted an idea about how the overall perception would 
be before data analysis. My interpretations will also include a comparative analysis of the 
findings in relation to the theoretical framework. Later, I will situate the findings interpreted 
through the theoretical lenses concerning what we know already from the literature review 
to say what this study contributes.  
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4.5 Practical and Ethical Considerations 
There have been a few practical challenges that resulted in changes in planned strategy. 
As mentioned earlier, corruption is still a sensitive topic for Azerbaijani people to talk with 
someone they do not know. Over 100 hundred emails were sent to the people who have 
experience with civil service recruitment arranged by the SEC. However, the majority of 
them did not reply. On top of that, around 10 people refused to participate when they were 
notified that there would be voice recording even though the whole interview was planned 
to be anonymous to protect the interviewee. They were mainly the ones who are currently 
holding positions in civil service. Another one was not having any interview belonged to the 
first category of the participants, which consists of people who failed at test exam stage and 
did not proceed to the interview. Thus, this research lacks the view of service users who were 
unsuccessful at the first stage of the recruitment. 
This study was registered with the Norwegian Center for Research Data (NSD), and it 
complies with data collection and data storage methods concerning ethical considerations. 
Before all interviews, participants were notified about their rights, including their right to 
withdraw from the research within the seven days after the interview. 
 Maintaining the anonymity of the service users was not a challenge. No name was 
mentioned during or after the interview. When storing the data, a specific code was given to 
each interviewee, such as "30womrec" which means that the data was collected from a 
woman who is 30 years old and recruited in civil service. Dilemma happened with expert 
interviews because the pool of the experts was limited, and when mentioned where they 
work might point who they were. However, all experts raised no concern about this; they 
even wanted their names to be included.  
 
4.6 Reliability and validity 
Scholars outline that  
“… central to the quality of qualitative research is whether participants’ perspectives 
have been authentically represented in the research process and the interpretations 
made from information gathered; and whether the findings are coherent in the sense 
that they “fit” the data and social context from which they were derived” (Fossey, 
Harvey, McDermott, Davidson, 2002, p.723).   
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Merriam and Tisdell further note that notwithstanding the nature of the research, 
reliability and validity deserve careful consideration of the study's conceptualization, in 
addition to thoughtful attention to data collection, analysis, presentation of findings, and 
finally interpretation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 238). In qualitative research, it is the 
researcher's role to provide enough details to show that his/her conclusions are reasonable 
(Merriam & Tisdell, 2015, p. 238).  
Stiles suggests that in qualitative research when interviewing respondents, the good 
practice advises asking "what questions" rather than "why" questions (Stiles, 1993, p.606). The 
rationale behind this is that the researcher needs participants to answer questions, and 
"what" questions require direct knowledge, unlike "why" questions that depend on generally 
insufficient justification. Instead of having insufficient justification, it is always more 
desirable to know "what."  
The quality of the research largely depends on the reliability and validity that are related 
to trustworthiness. Specifically, reliability concerns the trustworthiness of the data (whether 
observations are repeatable), while validity involves the trustworthiness of the 
interpretations (Stiles, 1993, p.601).  Creswell additionally notes that validity and reliability 
in qualitative research do not have the same implication as in quantitative research 
(Creswell, 2009, p.175). The suggested criteria for evaluating qualitative research's 
trustworthiness (rigour) are credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability, 
imitating internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity in quantitative research 
(Check Figure 6) (Fossey, Harvey, McDermott, Davidson, 2002, p.723).  
 
i. Credibility 
Thomas and Magilvy define credibility as "… the element that allows others to recognize the 
experiences contained within the study through the interpretation of participants’ experiences" 
(Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.152). While acknowledging qualitative researchers can never 
fully see "the whole picture" or capture the "truth, " several strategies address credibility, 
such as triangulation, which is the ultimate way of tackling reliability. An additional strategy 
is spending prolonged time with study participants, interview methods, and quoting 
participants while presenting findings that enhance credibility (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, 
p.153). Another strategy is member checking, which stands for when the interpretations are 
presented to the people from whom the data were generated to reflect their experiences 
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accurately.  Moreover, the researcher may ask peers or experienced consultants to review 
the data analysis process.   
In this research, the time spent with each participant of the research was around an hour, 
in which participants were encouraged to back up their arguments with examples and 
explanations. This contributed to the credibility of the research because each argument or 
statement by the participant is faced with the question of "why do you think so?". In this way, 
it was ensured that I got as close as possible to the understanding of the respondents. On top 
of that, in the research findings and discussion chapter, many quotes from the interviews 
are presented. By providing evidence to the researcher’s interpretation, as well as 
conclusions, increases the credibility.  Last but not least, my supervisor was engaged in 
reviewing the data analysis process, which also counts as the last strategy, peer checking. All 
the strategies used contribute significantly to the credibility of the research. 
 
ii. Transferability 
 “The ability to transfer research findings or methods from one group to another, or 
how one determines the extent to which the findings of a particular inquiry have 
applicability in other context or with other participants is called transferability in 
qualitative language” (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.153).  
To establish transferability, providing a thick description of the research participants, 
including demographic characteristics selection criteria for participants, depiction of the 
context and culture, and data analysis process. This ensures that the reader can decide 
whether the study might be replicated using the same data collection methods in the future.  
In this research, the reader can find a dense description of the demographics and 
selection criteria of the interview participants under section 4.2. "Recruiting interviewees," 
depiction of the context under section 2.0 "Context of the study," and finally the process of 
the data analysis in 4.4. "Data Analysis."  These descriptions allow a reader to make an 




iii. Dependability and Confirmability 
Lincoln and Guba define dependability as "seeking means for considering both factors of 
instability and factors of phenomenal or design induced changes" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, cited in 
Graneheim & Lundman, 2003, p.110).  Dependability concerns the consistency of the data 
collected. In qualitative research, asking questions related to the same inquiry is essential; 
however, follow-up questions might offer new insights (Graneheim & Lundman, 2003, 
p.110). Confirmability is established when credibility, transferability, and dependability are 
maintained in the study (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.154). Confirmability ensures that 
findings follow the participant's responses, and the researcher's biases and presumptions do 
not interfere. Thomas and Magilvy further advise that when conducting the interviewing 
researcher should not lead, instead follow the interviewee with asking for clarifications and 
so on (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.154).  
The suggested strategy for establishing dependability and confirmability is audit trial 
and reflexibility. Qualitative research is advised to explain the rationale for the decisions on 
research design and methodological choices and the researcher's interpretative judgments. 
Rigour Suggested Strategies Strategies used in this study
Credibility (internal validity)  
Value and believability of the 
findings
·Triangulation.
·Prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation.
·Peer debriefing.




Whether or not particular findings 
can be transferred to another   
similar context or situation
·Thick descriptions ·Thick description
Dependability (reliability)           




Neutrality and accuracy of the data
·Audit trial.
·Reflexivity ·Reflexivity
Table 4 Reliability and validity 
 49 
It ensures that the reader may disagree with the researcher's interpretation but finds out 
how s/he reached that interpretation (Houghton, Casey, Shaw, Murphy, 2013, p.14). Audit 
trials serve that purpose; they illustrate how the researcher collects and transparently 
analyzes data. 
 The other strategy to establish dependability and conformability is reflexivity.  
“The terms reflexivity, similar to construct validity in quantitative research, 
requires a self-critical attitude on the part of the researcher about how one's 
preconception affects the research" (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011, p.154).  
 Dodgson defines reflexivity as a golden standard for establishing trustworthiness 
(Dodgson, 2019, p.220). The researcher's responsibility in establishing reflexibility is to 
acknowledge self-knowledge on the topic and sensitivity, his/her role in creating the 
knowledge while controlling possible biases, beliefs, and experiences in their research 
(Berger, 2015, p.220). Berger mentions that 
 “… personal characteristics such as gender, race, affiliation, age, sexual 
orientation, immigration status, personal experiences, linguistic traditions, beliefs, 
biases, preference, theoretical, political and ideological stances"  
are relevant for the researcher's position (Berger, 2015, p.220).  
Among those personal characteristics relevant for this study might be personal 
experiences with the SEC or biases. I do not have any experience with the SEC’s services, 
which differentiates me from the service users. The only experience I have that might count 
similar is an exam for university admission organized by SCSA (since 2016, the SEC 
performs its tasks). As a member of the Azerbaijani society, I was exposed to the notion of 
the SEC being non/less corrupt, which was the starting point for this thesis. However, the 
interpretation of the findings is based on only the data gathered by service users and experts.  
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V.  Research Findings & Discussion 
This section of the research presents research findings alongside the discussion. The 
sections are organized according to the research questions. Findings start with how service 
users define corruption and following with what their tolerance levels are. After that, 
corruption perception in the public administration is described and discussed. It is followed 
by a subsection dedicated to how corrupt the service users perceive the SEC. The reader can 
learn more about the link between demographic characteristics and corruption perception 
in the subsection after that. Last but not least, the findings related to expert interviews are 
presented. 
 
5.1 Definition of corruption 
When asked about the definition of corruption, most research participants started with 
the abuse of the power or authority coming within the public position. It is similar to the 
definition of corruption suggested by Transparency International, which is "abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain."22 Since some of the participants worked in the public sector, 
they also highlight the words such as abuse of public authority, illegitimate opportunities, 
and benefits. The remaining participants defined corruption as "acting certain ways based on 
material and immaterial interests” (42womedumarrecpub), “enforcing illicit act under the 
influence of money or other gifts" (30manedumarnotrecbuss), and "performing legal procedures 
for any material gain and benefit” (26manedusingrecpub).    
As mentioned earlier in the study, candidates are asked to answer questions related to 
the Republic of Azerbaijan legislation in a written test examination. The legislation includes 
the "Law on Combating Corruption."  The law starts with the definition of corruption which 
is  
"… illicit obtaining by an official of material and other values, privileges, or advantages, 
by using for that purpose his or her position, or the status of the body he or she 
represents, or his or her official powers, or the opportunities deriving from those 
statuses or powers, as well as the bribery of an official by illicit offering, promising or 
 
22  See https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption accessed 20 June 2021. 
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giving him or her by individuals or legal persons of the said material and other values, 
privileges or advantages."23   
It was expected that participants of this study, who already taken the written exam for 
civil service recruitment, would know the law and refer to it when asked what corruption is; 
thus, that was no surprise.  
 Given that, participants of the research also referred to the law when asked about the 
forms of corruption.  Almost half of the participants recalled the law and mentioned two 
forms of corruption which are "… offenses related to corruption consist of corruption offenses 
themselves and offenses conducive to corruption."24  They even stressed out that similar 
questions are commonly asked during test examinations and interviews. While one of the 
participants (30manedumarnotrecbuss) touched upon the classification of corruption based 
on the scale of it (petty vs. grand) and supported his answer with examples for each category 
(bribery to the police and high amounts of money circulating among big businesses and 
public officers, respectively), the other one (27womedusingnotrecpub) classified corruption 
as being material and immaterial. When she (27womedusingnotrecpub) mentioned this 
classification, she refers to the type of assets promised. For example, bribery occurs when 
someone with entrusted power demands or accepts an unfair advantage, which might be 
material such as money or immaterial such as an influence. 
Furthermore, only one participant (34womedumarrecpub) classifies corruption based 
on the motive behind it. She believes (34womedumarrecpub) motive might be individual 
interest or pressure from the organization he or she is working at.  Lastly, two participants 
did not give any answer to the question. 
 Answers provided by participants revealed different views on the forms of 
corruption, and the most common one was based on the type of offenses stated in the law. 
It is usual for most respondents to classify corruption based on how it is described in the 
law, and this is natural since they are trained to know the law, not to analyze the corruption 
scientifically. However, that classification does not include anything about the scale or 
 
23 See Article1. of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Combating Corruption http://www.e-
qanun.az/framework/5809 accessed 20 June 2021. 
24 Check Article 9 of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Combating Corruption http://www.e-
qanun.az/framework/5809 accessed 20 June 2021. 
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motive of the corruption discussed in this research. Thus, it is natural for participants not to 
know about the other classifications of corruption. 
 
5.2 Corruption tolerance 
To assess the study participants' corruption tolerance, one particular question was 
asked: "In which cases do you think that corruption might be justified?". When a person 
justifies corruption, it shows that s/he has a certain degree of tolerance toward corruption. 
Over half of the service users stated that in no cases could corruption be justified.  Some of 
them explained the rationale behind their clear-cut attitude towards corruption: 
 “When you know the laws and demand the rightful implementation of the law, 
nobody can even try to initiate the "need corruption" (42womedumarrecpub). 
“Even if creates more opportunities for you, corruption is violating other’s rights” 
(32manedumarrecpub). 
“For the sake of his or her future, society and country, nobody should justify the 
corruption” (34womedumarrecpub). 
The remaining participants reported that in some instances, certain kinds of corruption 
offenses are justifiable. These participants explained their position along the following 
lines: 
“It is easier to handle certain processes with petty corruption in Azerbaijan. Petty 
corruption prevents wasting time and stressing. However, greed corruption should 
never be justified” (27womedusingnotrecpub).  
“When the provision of the public service is low in a country, corruption is a need. If 
there is slow working bureaucracy, even though nobody asks for a bribe, you offer to 
fasten the process”. (30manedumarnotrecbuss).  
“People can justify the petty corruption because nobody in Azerbaijan considers this as 
illegal” (25womedumarnotrec). 
When people know the laws and their rights, they are expected to become more 
preventive toward corruption. Bearing in mind that participants of this research were 
trained to know the laws, I expected them to show less tolerance toward corruption. It is 
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evident from the answers that people who have a certain degree of tolerance towards 
corruption only show tolerance to petty or need corruption. Considering that petty 
corruption is also defined in the literature as more tolerable than political or grand 
corruption, such answers were expected. We know that petty corruption is considered white 
corruption, which is considered more acceptable than political corruption. 
5.3 Service user’s corruption perception of public administration 
After participants were notified of how corruption is defined in this research (misuse of 
entrusted power), they were asked how they perceive the corruption in the overall public 
administration of Azerbaijan.  
The majority of the respondent expressed that they perceive the level of corruption as 
medium or medium-high. They highlighted the fact that the government takes substantial 
measures to tackle corruption.  
"A few years ago, the police would have no fear or concern to ask obviously for a bribe 
when you violate the rules; now they are afraid and worried” 
(34womedumarrecpub).  
 A group of the respondents felt that compared to 5-10 years ago, the level of corruption 
in public administration is now very low. One of these respondents (42womedumarrecpub) 
supported her opinion that there are significant initiatives toward e-government.  According 
to her, "now most of the service provisions are carried out electronically, and there is no human 
intervention in the process" (42womedumarrecpub).  Another respondent felt that even though 
the government initiates essential measures, citizens still cannot perceive that they can get 
the services without paying bribes. "Mentally, they are not there yet" (25womedumarnotrec). 
Lastly, one respondent stressed that corruption in public administration is still very high 
(30manedumarnotrecbuss).  
Participants were also questioned about the most corrupt and least corrupt (or corrupt-
free) bodies in the public administration system. Visual presentation of the answers is 
illustrated above (Figure 7). As the most corrupt body, service users mention the local 
executive bodies alongside with Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoEs) and State 
Customs Committee (SCC). “No matter whether they are executive bodies in regions or big cities, 
the most corrupt ones are them” (25womedumarrecsing). 
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More or less, the answers provided by the participants conform with the findings in 
OECD reports. The OECD report stated that ASAN, Ministry of Education, and Presidential 
Administration are among the highest public trust among the Azerbaijani population 
(OECD, 2016, p.17). The majority of the participants felt that the State Agency for Public 
Service and Social Innovations (ASAN) is the least corrupt (or corrupt-free) body in the 
public administration. According to participants, the SEC follows ASAN in that matter.  
 
   
Note: The above abbreviations are Agency for Sustainable and Operative Social Provision (DOST), State 
Agency for Public Service and Social Innovations (ASAN), Ministry of Education (MoE), Ministry of Health 
(MoH), Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES), State Customs Committee (SCC) State Examination Center 















Figure 3 The most and the least corrupt entities in Azerbaijan 
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Questions revealed that service users perceive the corruption in the Azerbaijani public 
administration differently, but most felt it might be rated as medium. It is worth noting that 
respondents were educated people and, recalling what is discussed in the theoretical 
framework section, respondents were expected to perceive less corruption than uneducated 
ones, implying that other people would perceive even higher corruption in the public 
administration. Respondents stress the recent measures addressing corruption prevention 
by creating the State Agency for Public Service and Social Innovations (ASAN) and 
digitalizing public service provisions. Even though Transparency International ranks 
Azerbaijan among the countries with high corruption perception, the service users 
appreciate the recent trends. They believe that as the results of reforms and preventive 
initiatives, corruption will decrease in 5-10 years. 
 
5.4 Service user’s corruption perception of the SEC 
The majority of the participants perceive the SEC as one of the least/non-corrupt 
organizations in the public administration.  The remaining ones emphasize that they have 
no trust issues regarding the written examination process regarding fairness and 
transparency but do raise questions concerning the interview stage. Participants who do not 
consider the SEC as least/non-corrupt are those who did not pass the interview stage and 
did not participate in the interview, specifically, respondents coded 
(30manedumarnotrecbus) and (27womedusingnotrecpub). This perception might be due to 
unsuccessful results concluded that the process is not fair/transparent, or not having whole 
experience on the process.  
Participants were also specifically asked how they perceive transparency and fairness in 
written examination and interview. Starting with a written test examination, all participants 
provided their positive thoughts. With no exception, all of them agreed that there is no 
human factor in written test examination since special machines automatically grade the 
test examination. Thus, they believe this stage is corruption-free. Some of them recalled 
their experience with a former commission on student's admission to a higher university. 
They stated that since that time, test examinations have an excellent reputation in terms of 
preventing corruption. One of the participants (42womedumarrecpub) is also working as an 
exam inspector during written test exams commented that whenever she is assigned to 
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monitoring exams, she is witnessing how strictly the SEC takes precautions about questions 
to have nobody access to them. She added that "not a single breath of human being touches the 
questions after the experts sealed it."  
Even though participants of the study perceived written test examination corrupt-free, 
there were some doubts about their opinions on the interview stage. The overall response 
to this question was positive as well.  Only one respondent (30manedumarnotrecbuss)  
indicated that he did not consider the interview stage as transparent. He further noted that 
there were three different experts and video recording to ensure transparency, but there was 
nothing extraordinary. This participant might feel that the process was not fully transparent 
because he did not pass the interview stage; however, he did not appeal the decision. One 
respondent (27womedusingnotrecpub) did not answer, as she did not participate in an 
interview. In response to this question, some participants felt that experts purposefully try 
to create a comfortable environment for the candidates to express their thoughts and 
answers freely.  In their opinion, sometimes experts intend to "squeeze" answer from the 
candidate when they see that s/he stresses and has trouble answering.  
Last but not least, participants were asked whether they or someone they know had any 
corruption experience with the SEC. All participants noted that they did not know anyone 
who got an unfair advantage in the written test or interview stage because of bribery or other 
corrupt offenses.  Interestingly, the only participant, who does not consider the interview 
stage fully transparent, did not have or know any corrupt behavior related to the SEC 
(27womedusingnotrecpub). Given that she could not provide any substantial explanation as 
she did not have any experience, she may have a bias towards the SEC. One participant 
(25womedumarnotrec)  confessed that she thought she could get an advantage in the 
interview stage to find someone who influences the decision. To be more specific, she  
"... was thinking that if I could find some who has links to the recruiting state body, 
s/he could help me to get the job. I found it, but it did not help. I tried to use personal 
relationships; it did not work. They decided rightly; I was not ready or qualified for the 
position. Then I worked on myself and participated in the interview once more. I got a 
higher mark than the first interview, but still, it was not enough for passing the 
interview.  At last, in my third try, I passed the interview stage" 
(25womedumarnotrec).   
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The other two participants (25womedusingrecpub and 32manedumarrecpub) also 
repeated that when they failed at the interview stage, they did not blame the experts saying 
that they undegraded his/their skills acknowledged that failure was due to shallow or 
incomplete answers. On top of that, another two participants (34womedumarrecpub and 
33womedumarrecpub) recalled what they heard from people they know. These people tried 
to bribe either the expert from the SEC or the one from recruiting state body, but their 
efforts were useless. Because even if they would manage to bribe one expert to give a higher 
grade, there are still two experts who assess the candidate.  In a simplistic view, it suggests 
that having three experts in the interview, who are independent of each other, ensures 
fairness in the interview stage. 
There were doubts about the interview stage because grading is subjective, and experts 
have the right to evaluate the candidate's qualifications from their perspectives. In addition 
to that, the last word in the recruitment process belongs to the recruiting state body. As 
mentioned earlier in the study, this is the most suspicious part of the process because no 
justification is provided. However, most participants perceive the SEC as corrupt-free, if not 
significantly less corrupt. This study revealed that whoever participated in a written test 
examination organized by the SEC has no trust issues on transparency and fairness because 
their answers are graded objectively since there is no human factor involved. Nobody could 
argue that questions asked in the exam are out of topic because the list of the literature that 
questions are designed from is publicly available. Its the exam taker's responsibility to be 
prepared for the exam. Even though some service users doubt the recruitment decision, in 
their view, everything was smooth and transparent from the SEC's part. Given that this 
study aims to investigate the corruption perception of the service users, after discussing all 
the stages of the recruitment process, the service user's overall corruption perception in the 
SEC is very low, which supports the anecdotal evidence. 
As stated earlier in the 3.4. Theoretical Framework section educated people tend to 
perceive lower corruption. Considering that bachelor-level education is a requirement for 
civil service, all service users either have bachelor's or master's degrees.  Results imply that 
interviewees perceive a lower level of corruption in the SEC, which might mean that other 
people may perceive more. However, this study does not involve any low educated people 
to prove that claim. 
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5.5 Differences in perception based on demographic characteristics 
A brief review of how demographic characteristics such as gender, education level, 
employment sector, marital status, and age influence the corruption perception is 
mentioned earlier in the 3.4. Theoretical Framework section. Here I will describe the research 
findings alongside discussion (See Table 5).  
i. Women have lower corruption tolerance than men.
Starting with the relationship between corruption tolerance and gender, most women
respondents show no tolerance toward corruption. In contrast, the man majority feel that, 
to some degree, corruption is justifiable and tolerable. Torgler and Valev note that gender 
does have an impact on corruption tolerance. They believe that women, in comparison, are 
less likely to justify corruption (Torgler & Valev, 2006, p.138). This study's research findings 
also conform with Torgler and Valev, suggesting that women tend to have less tolerance for 
corruption than men. A minority of female participants felt that corruption is justifiable, 
noting that petty corruption helps to cut the bureaucracy and stress. On the other hand, 
most man participants stated that corruption to some degree is tolerable. They also provided 
similar explanations for their statements, which are very similar to what women 
participants who, to some degree, tolerate the corruption. 
ii. Women have a higher corruption perception than men
Turning now to the relationship between gender and corruption perception, researchers
believed that being a woman increases the probability of perceiving higher corruption 
(Dollar, Fisman, & Gatti, 2001 p.424). They further claimed that women are less likely to 
sacrifice the common good for their benefit.  Let us start with the findings related to 
corruption perception in the overall public administration system. On average, men 
participants perceive low-medium level corruption in public administration, while for 
women, it is medium-high. This supports the previous claims made by Dollar, Fisman, and 
Gatti, stating that women tend to perceive higher corruption than men. As far as perceived 
corruption in the SEC is concerned, findings revealed that it is very low for women, while 
for men, it is low-medium. It appears that findings related to corruption perception do not 
confirm the argument because, obviously, male participants perceive higher corruption in 
the SEC than women. 
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iii. Private Sector employees perceive higher corruption than the ones in the public 
sector 
Melgar, Rossi, and Smith state that people who are working in the private sector usually 
perceive higher corruption than their counterparts in the public sector because they are on 
the "supply" side of the "bribe market" (Melgar, Rossi, Smith, 2010, p.192). Given that only one 
participant working in the private sector engaged in the study, the data is insufficient to 
claim the role of the employment sector in corruption perception, and further data 
collection is required. Nevertheless, findings show that the participant who works in the 
private sector has the highest corruption perception in public administration and the SEC. 
For public administration, he perceived the level as high and for the SEC as medium. In 
contrast, the remaining participants working in the public sector felt medium and very low, 
respectively. Given that findings are based on a limited number of participants working in 
the private sector, the interpretation should be treated cautiously. Thus, based on limited 
Demographics of the Interview Participants
Gender Age Education level Marital Status Sector Corruption Tolerance CP (public administration) CP (SEC)
woman 42 bachelor married public no tolerance low very low
woman 34 bachelor married public no tolerance medium very low
woman 33 bachelor married public no tolerance medium-high very low
woman 27 master single public (not rec) some degree (petty) medium-high low
woman 25 bachelor married not working some degree (petty) medium very low
woman 25 master single public no tolerance medium-high very low
 man 32 master married public no tolerance low very low
man 30 master married business some degree (petty) high medium
man 26 bachelor single public some degree (petty) low low-medium
Table 5 Demographics of service users with corruption perception 
information, it would be unsound to conclude that public sector employees perceive lower 
corruption than their counterparts in the private sector. 
iv. Differences depending on the marital status, education, and age
Recalling discussion on marital status and corruption perception, we know that divorced
people tend to perceive higher corruption than married ones. Unfortunately, this study does 
not include any divorced participant regarding the influence of marital status on corruption 
perception. However, if we compare the results between single and married participants, 
not a distinguished difference was found both in corruption overall public administration 
and in the SEC. 
Unfortunately, this research does not involve any participant who does not have 
secondary education regarding the relationship between education and corruption 
perception. The research focuses on service users who directly experience the SEC and can 
evaluate the SEC's transparency and fairness. 
Turning to the relationship between age and corruption perception, the literature 
suggests no significant influence. Belonging to a specific age group does not determine how 
much one person perceives corruption.  This research does not contain enough data to 
confirm or reject this statement because an older segment of the recruited people either took 
the test before the SEC's establishment or worked on civil service for more than 5 years. 
Thus, the research lacks interviews with older civil servants or civil service candidates and 
their data to comment on the relationship between age and corruption perception.  Data 
collected from interviews also confirm with the abovementioned statement. 
5.6 Experts’ corruption perception in the SEC and the rest of the public 
administration  
Starting with the definition of corruption, two experts (Expert 1 and Expert 2) directly 
quote the definition suggested by Transparency International, i.e., misuse of trusted power, 
which is to be expected given that both have working experience with TI. The third expert-
defined corruption as misuse of the status of the position or the organization that a person 
is working at to get material or immaterial benefits. They also elaborated on the definition 
by saying, "corruption is a form of stealing, it is stealing from resources” (Expert 1), "corruption is 
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opposite of transparency; if there is no transparency, corruption exists" (Expert 3). Expert 1 also 
touched upon the corruption definition stated in Azerbaijani legislation and compared it 
with the definition suggested by TI. According to him, the definition stated in legislation is 
longer, harder to remember and understand. Expert 3 added that the legislation related to 
corruption should be reviewed because universally accepted corruption offenses, such as 
nepotism, are not described as corruption in Azerbaijani legislation.  
Different opinions were expressed on the motivation behind corruption. However, 2 
experts agreed on civil servants' low wages. "Corruption usually happens when a civil servant 
cannot meet minimum living standards with his/her official wage" (Expert 3). He justifies that 
when a civil servant fails to meet minimum standard of living with his/her official wage, his 
moral values can resist corruption on a few occasions, and followingly, s/he starts to engage 
in corruption. In this case, corruption has a need motive.  
"Alongside with low wages, gaps in the legislation allow civil servants to engage in 
corruption. Gaps in the laws conduce that civil servants are offered money to fasten 
the process of, for example, provision of public services" (Expert 1). 
 The second motivation mentioned by the expert (Expert 3) is greediness by the civil 
servants. It does not happen because of the need to meet a minimum standard of living but 
from desires and ambitions.  
Experts expressed various opinions on corruption trends in Azerbaijan. First of all, they 
acknowledged that there are positive trends in combating corruption in public 
administration; however, still corrupt-free or very least corrupted public administration is 
not achieved. Experts perceived the corruption level in overall public administration as 
medium, medium, and low, respectively (Expert 1, Expert 2, Expert 3). They believe that in 
the low levels of the civil service, petty corruption, if not entirely, but is almost gone, thanks 
to the e-government initiatives and establishment of ASAN Centers.  Turning to grand 
corruption, Expert 2 noted that in comparison with ten years ago, now government tries to 
prevent it. Lately, there have been a few arrests of high-rank officials. Expert 1 felt that even 
though there are significant achievements related to curbing petty corruption, it is hard to 
change citizens’ perceptions. They still believe that corruption is everywhere. 
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When questioned about the least corrupt/corrupt-free entity in the administration, all 
experts named ASAN Centers and the SEC. Besides them, Expert 2 mentioned that most 
state bodies are now aimed at institutional reforms to prevent corruption.  
"Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population (MoLSPS) and Ministry of 
Economics (MoEc) can be examples in this regard. Especially MoLSPS was very 
corrupt.  Of course, some civil servants are engaged in corruption using their 
relationships and link. However, it is not at the institutional level; they are the 
exception” (Expert 3).  
As far as most corrupt state bodies, entities are concerned, again, different opinions were 
presented.  Interestingly, Expert 2 remarked concerning MoLSPS,  
"the most known one for corruption perception is MoLSPS. However, it is the entity 
that is in contact with the population the most because of the nature of the services. 
Moreover, they deal with the most fragile segments of the population, who do not have 
anything to lose if they raise their voices. Thus, we hear more about this ministry.  Lots 
of complaints are also available about corruption in State Customs Commission (SCC). 
However, business owners are not interested in complaining officially” (Expert 2).  
Expert 3 mentioned the SCC too, stating that media representatives revealed corruption 
activities in the SCC before it was known as very corrupt and business owners. However, 
now significant steps have been taken to prevent corruption. Last but not least, local 
executive bodies were suggested as the most corrupt entities in public administration by 
Expert 1.   
 
i. Experts’ corruption perception in the SEC 
As previously mentioned, all experts agree that the SEC is among the least 
corrupt/corrupt-free entities in public administration. Expert 1 stated that he had been 
invited as an independent expert to the interview stage since the SEC was established, not 
in a single time, he encountered any corrupt activity. They were very confident when saying 
that written test examination is corrupt-free. Expert 2 highlighted the fact that everything is 
digitalized. Thus, no corruption is possible in the written examination.  
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"There is no problem with the SEC; the problem arises at the last stage, the recruitment 
decision. We do not know based on which criteria whey choose whom to hire among 
successfully passed candidates. It is not transparent" (Expert 2).    
Expert 1, who also attends interviews as the independent expert, expressed that 
the interview stage is also fair and transparent: "It is possible to get bribery offers; 
however, there is no mechanism to realize bribery.” 
 He recalls the fact that there are three experts, who are independent of each other, 
evaluating the qualification of the candidates. Expert three emphasizes that practically all 
measures are taken into consideration in order to prevent any corruption intentions. For 
example, the SEC is responsible for inviting the independent experts for the interview, and 
the recruiting state body does not know who will be invited. In this way, the SEC aims to 
avoid any negotiation before interviews. Another measure is video recording that ensures 
that they can go over the recording if any dissatisfaction arises.  
 
 
When it comes to the most suspicious stage, which is the recruitment decision, Expert 2 
felt that the process is incomplete; the SEC cannot do anything about the recruitment 
decision. If only one candidate passed the interview, then he is directly recruited. However, 
when more than one candidate passes the interview, then without any justification, the head 
of the state body has the right to choose whom to hire among candidates. Expert 1 admitted 
that they could not monitor that process, and there should be adjustment in the law in that 
regard. Expert 3 noted that this right is given to the head of the recruiting state body because 
they should have a certain degree of discretion at formulating their human capital. The SEC 
only monitors the recruitment of the candidates who are put to the reserve list, but it does 
Recruited exper ts Their exper tise Relationship with   the SEC
Expert 1 Corruption Engages in the interview process
Expert 2 Corruption No relationship
Expert 3 Civil Service Works at the SEC
CP in public 




Table 6 Characteristics and corruption perception of the experts 
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not have the right to question the head of the state body's decision on whom to hire the first 
place. 
An employee from the SEC's civil service department kindly provided me with the 
documents related to the preparation rules, approval of test samples for admission to civil 
service, and rules for conducting interviews. The following points are based on these two 
documents and information gained from Expert3. When reviewing the whole process, we 
see that the system for written examination is designed so that no human intervention is 
possible. The tests for the examination are prepared in a secure location with no connection 
outside. The test writers are not allowed to go out for two days and contact anyone. Once all 
questions are formulated, they seal and present them to the special security guards to 
convey them to the exam venues.  The relocation of the exam inspectors is also unknown 
until the night before the actual exam date, and inspectors only learn the venue, but not the 
actual room in which they will monitor candidates. So practically, the SEC prevents any 
interaction between candidates and the exam inspectors before the examination. When the 
examination ends, the exam papers are sealed and sent to the machines to grade. If there 
are few exam takers, then the exam is carried out electronically, and right after the exam, 
candidates can see their results on the screen. 
In the interview stage, there are sufficient preventive measures against corruption. 
Grading by three experts, who are independent of each other, ensures that no expert can 
pressure others to be biased. It is not very probable for the same person to be graded very 
low by two experts but very high from the other one. Slight differences are probable, but 
significant differences are not logical. On top of that, all experts have the same rights; the 
expert from recruiting state body does not have any privileges to decide who will pass the 
interview stage. Experts are allowed to discuss the qualifications of the candidates; however, 
in the end, they are independent in grading.  
Another issue aimed at ensuring transparency is the candidate's right to appeal the 
interview result. In this case, video recording seems very handy. The appeal commission 
investigates the issue based on video recording and arguments of both experts and 
candidates, then makes a decision. 
Recalling Klitgaard's corruption formula (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – 
Accountability), as discussed earlier, the SEC has a certain degree of monopoly on civil 
service recruitment and discretion on its services and not a very strong accountability 
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mechanism. Considering all of these, we might expect the SEC to be corrupt to some degree. 
However, experts feel the opposite, stating it as one of the least corrupt or corrupt-free 
organizations in public administration. Expert 2 stated there is no absolute monopoly power 
belonging to SEC regarding civil service recruitment. They do not arrange recruitment for 
law enforcement bodies such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Courts, 
and Prosecutor's office. She also highlighted that having discretion is fine as long as the law 
defines this discretion. The processes were highly digitalized, and human intervention is 
minimized. 
On top of that, alongside accountability to the President, there are also publicly available 
reports on the website. Expert 1 believed that the SEC is corrupt-free because it has 
mechanisms to ensure transparency, such as accessible literature for preparation for the 
exam, having different experts to interview, video recording, and the right to appeal. On top 
of that, Expert 3 added that anyone could easily watch the interview stage, and for that 
purpose, no prior consent is needed. Whoever wants to observe the process needs to write 
an email to SEC stating that s/he has that intent. Taking all responses into account, the 
reason why the SEC is perceived as corrupt free or least corrupt while Klitgaard's formula 
suggested it to be corrupt to some degree is the transparency measures.  
Expert 3 adds another organizational characteristic that is potentially relevant in 
preventing corruption in the SEC - institutional culture. In his view, the SEC’s ethical 
culture has already been maintained in which impartiality and preventing material benefits 
help to hinder corruption. He further stresses the role of the leadership in that regard.	 
“People behave based on the demands and requirements. It is sporadic to behave 
against the external demands in the public sector, especially in our society. From the 
first day, the leadership made it crystal clear that no corrupt practices are tolerable in 
the SEC, and anyone engaged in corruption will face severe problems.	They lead with 
example, and colleagues in lower positions follow them. All processes are transparent 
in the SEC; it is impossible to engage in corruption” (Expert 3). 
Considering that Expert 3 is working at the SEC, his views on this culture might be 
biased since it is in his interest to speak well about the SEC and its organizational culture. 
According to the answer provided by experts participating in the research, the SEC 
successfully carries out all the duties and responsibilities written in the law. The only 
instance that is under question from the very beginning of this study, specifically the 
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recruitment decision, is not in the hands of the SEC. However, Expert 1 remarked that the 
responsibilities of the SEC are extensive, and it cannot handle all of them at once. According 
to him, the SEC mainly organizes written examinations and conducts interviews. There 
should be a separate organization called Civil Service Commission or Ethics Committee, 
dealing with ethics issues in civil service and comprehensive monitoring of the law's 
implementation. He suggests that the new entity must be accountable for both the President 
and parliament. This would also add to the accountability in the Klitgaard’s formula and 
increases the possibility of having less corruption.   In this regard, Expert 3 mentions an 
Ethics Code that applies to all civil servants. The Code25 defines the norms and ethics 
applicable to the civil servants and establishes a legal mechanism to monitor these norms’ 
executions. The SEC also monitors the execution of this Code. In addition, the SEC often 
organizes training to educate its employees about ethical conduct, and their employees 
arrange training for the civil servants in other organizations. Taken together, these findings 
would seem to suggest that the SEC fulfill its responsibilities defined by the law, but it would 





25 See the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Rules of Ethical Conduct of Civil Servants. 
https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/pages/63/  accessed on 26 June 2021. 
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VI. Conclusions 
This chapter will briefly present general conclusions drawn based on the key findings of 
the research.  In addition, policy recommendations and implications will be made. 
Furthermore, ideas for future studies alongside policy recommendations will follow.  
 
6.1. Answering Research Questions 
The findings of this research imply that the service users perceive the corruption in the 
overall public sector as a medium to medium-high while stressing that the government has 
recently taken significant measures to curb corruption. They also name a few organizations 
as the most corrupt such as State Security Services, local executive bodies, and Ministry of 
Emergency. In contrast, the State Agency for Public Service and Social Innovations (ASAN), 
the State Examination Center (SEC), and the Agency for Sustainable and Operative Social 
Provision (DOST), in addition to a handful of organizations, were perceived as corrupt-free 
or the least corrupt. Specifically, the service users felt that the SEC is corrupt-free or, to a 
tiny extent corrupt since they have absolute trust in written examination and few concerns 
related to the interview stage. After discussions, it was revealed that these concerns were not 
necessarily related to the interview process but instead to what happens after the interview 
is a recruitment decision by the recruiting state body.  
Turning to how corruption perception is linked to demographic characteristics, findings 
confirm that women have a lower tolerance of corruption than men Literature taken into 
consideration in this research suggested that women tend to perceive higher perceptions 
than men. Results show that when corruption perception in overall Azerbaijan public 
administration is concerned, then women perceive higher than men. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to the corruption perception in the SEC, it is the opposite; men perceive higher than 
women.  Even though only one service user was working in the private sector, the findings 
still point towards the idea that people working in the private sector are more prone to 
perceive higher corruption than public sector employees. No particular pattern was 
observed as far as the link between marital status and corruption perception. Given that 
there is a bachelor's degree requirement for the civil service examination, all the service 
users were highly educated. Thus, study results allow making no argument on the effect of 
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education on corruption perception. Last but not least, while from previous studies, age is 
believed not to have a specific effect on corruption perception; however, not enough age 
groups were involved in the study to comment on this.  
Experts vary somewhat in terms of their corruption perception in public administration, 
while two of them felt that is in medium level, the expert working in the SEC perceive it as 
low. However, concerning corruption perception in the SEC, they all agree that it is low to 
very low. The only instance noted by one of the experts was discretion at recruitment 
decision that lies in the recruiting state body's head.   
 This research started with the question of "Is the SEC an island of integrity?".  
According to the respondents, the SEC is perceived as corrupt-free or corrupt to a very 
limited extend. However, is it an island? Considering that the SEC was not the only 
answered to the questions of the least corrupt or corrupt-free organization in the public 
sector, it cannot be claimed as an island of integrity. It should be praised for its performance 
to prevent corruption; however, to name it an island of integrity would be wrong since other 
organizations are very similar to SEC regarding corruption perception.   
 
6.2. Contributions and reflections 
Considering the SEC being a newly established entity, this research is a valuable 
contribution to the literature on civil service in Azerbaijan. It has gone some way towards 
enhancing our understanding of corruption perception in civil service recruitment. To the 
best of my knowledge, there was no research conducted to investigate whether anecdotal 
evidence regarding the low corruption perception in the SEC reflects reality or not. 
Secondly, it also revealed that corruption perception and specific demographic 
characteristics could be linked. Besides that, to the best of my knowledge, other than CPI by 
Transparency International, not many studies have been targeted to measure corruption 
perception in Azerbaijan, so this study is among the first in that respect as well. 
Different theoretical approaches were discussed to investigate whether the SEC is an 
island of integrity in which, unlike the rest of the public administration, any corrupt 
activities are prevented. The corruption forms, including petty vs. grand and need vs. greed 
corruption, were considered to analyze possible corruption cases in the SEC. On top of that, 
Klitgaard's corruption formula was applied to the organizational characteristics of the SEC. 
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Namely, the SEC's monopoly, discretion, and accountability were explicitly reviewed in the 
theoretical framework section.  
Interestingly, suppose we apply Klitgaard's formula to the SEC. In that case, we expect 
it to be corrupt to some extent, but it is not. Both service users and experts perceive it as a 
corrupt-free or the least corrupt organization. Yes, at face value, it has a certain degree of 
monopoly, yes it has low discretion in its services and minimal accountability, which is only 
to the President, but all practices are carried out transparently. It has mixed discretion 
regarding which processes they have discretion and what kind of discretion they have is not 
fully known, but there is not much room to maneuver. Therefore, Klitgaard's formula needs 
to be updated or reformulated because, in specific empirical contexts, the concepts of 
monopoly, discretion, and accountability are not dichotomous. 
In this research, a qualitative approach was used to explore the SEC's corruption 
perception to check anecdotal claims. For that purpose, the case study strategy was chosen, 
utilizing semi-structured interviews to get necessary and related information from a 
specifically chosen research participant. Alongside the data gathered from semi-structured 
interviews, different documents were also analyzed, which were later used in the analysis.  
This work has some limitations, such as not having any service user who failed at the 
written examination and not including civil servants belonging to older age groups. Thus, I 
could not analyze the relationship between age and corruption perception in detail and 
comment on statements by Melgar, Rossi, and Smith (2010).  
 
6.3. Implications for further research and practice 
This study can serve as a base for future studies on corruption perception in different 
organizations in Azerbaijan. The results of this research were encouraging, with more 
prominent participants including older age groups and people who failed at written 
examination study may well be repeated. On a broader level, a similar study is 
recommended to evaluate the corruption perception of civil service recruitment organized 
by the SEC and all services provided by them, including exams for admission to universities.  
Other than that, future work should concentrate on a more profound analysis of the reasons 
behind the low corruption perception in the SEC. It might be a large-scale quantitative 
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survey with service users that will collect subjective data on the nature and scale of the 
corruption and evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. 
Based on the research findings following policy recommendations are given: 
Establishing clear criteria for the recruitment decision:  Given that in both service user's 
and expert's interviews, the recruitment decision was the most suspicious instance in the 
whole process, I recommend having explicit criteria for hiring. Until a recruitment decision, 
phases in the recruitment process are considered transparent and fair since the written 
examination does not involve any human intervention. The interview stage includes three 
experts who are independent of each other to ensure transparency and fairness. As Expert 
2 emphasized, there is too much discretion in the decision; neither are there clear criteria 
for selection nor justification.  Expert 3 also mentioned that a new bill was presented to Milli 
Mejlis (legislative branch in Azerbaijan). New criteria for selecting the most qualified civil 
servants among candidates are mentioned. So far, this bill is not available to the public yet; 
however, according to Expert 3, the new criteria are: the candidate who got the highest point 
from the interview should be recruited, if more than one candidate got the same result, then 
priority will be given to the one who graduated with distinction. If several candidates satisfy 
this requirement, then language skills will be considered. Hopefully, this bill will be passed, 
and new regulations will increase the overall transparency of the recruitment process. 
Establishing recruitment for civil servants at public legal entities: Even though there is a 
well-established process for recruitment for civil servants, there is no mechanism for those 
who want to be hired in public legal entities.  Considering that there is a new trend 
establishing different public legal entities within ministries or larger state bodies, special 
attention must be given to its recruitment process. A public legal entity is neither totally 
public nor private, has the elements of both; thus, the SEC cannot be involved in its 
recruitment process. In the future, more such entities may well be established with vast 
discretion on whom to hire, which is a very suitable condition for practicing corruption. 
Moving towards those entities will result in a decrease in recruitment organized by the SEC. 
Thus, I propose establishing a new mechanism for recruiting employees in public legal 
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Categorization   of state bodies 
1st category 
state bodies
Supreme Mejlis of the Nakhichevan Autonomous   Republic
Chief Prosecutor?s Office of the Republic of   Azerbaijan
Chamber of Accounts of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Office of Judicial Legal Board
Office of an Attorney of the Republic of Azerbaijan   for Human Rights (Ombudsman)
2nd category 
state bodies
Supreme Court of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
Relevant executive power body of the Nakhichevan   Autonomous Republic
Military Prosecutor?s Office of the Republic of   Azerbaijan
Prosecutor?s Office of the Nakhichevan Autonomous   Republic
Office of an Attorney of the Nakhichevan Autonomous   Republic for Human Rights (Ombudsman)
Appeal courts of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Office of the Central Election Commission of the   Republic of Azerbaijan
Secretariat of the Commission on Fight against   Corruption of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Relevant executive power bodies
Office of the National TV and Radio-Broadcasting   Board
3rd category 
state bodies
State agencies and state services established under   the relevant executive power bodies
Regional centers of the Office of an Attorney of the   Republic of Azerbaijan for Human Rights (Ombudsman)
Office of the central election commission of the   Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
Relevant executive power bodies of the Nakhichevan   Autonomous Republic
Office of the National tv and Radio-Broadcasting   Board
Courts on grave crimes
Administrative economic courts
Military courts
Military prosecutor?s office of the Nakhichevan   Autonomous Republic
Baku city prosecutor?s office
4th category 
state bodies
Relevant executive power bodies
Regional divisions of relevant executive power   bodies
Bodies subordinate to/under relevant executive power   bodies
City (region) courts
District (city) prosecutor?s offices
5th category 
state bodies
Local divisions of state agencies and state services   established under relevant executive power bodies
Bodies under relevant executive power
Representations of relevant executive power bodies   in an administrative territorial district
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Appendix 2 
 Classification of administrative positions in civil service
Supreme state bodies? the   main executive, legislative and judiciary bodies of Republic of Azerbaijan:
1)Administration of President of Republic of Azerbaijan, including   Administrative Department of the 










Head of the Presidential Administration of the   Republic of Azerbaijan
Head of the Administrative Department of the   President
Head of Special Medical Service of the President
Head of the Secretariat of the First Vice-President   of Republic of Azerbaijan
Head of Office of Milli Mejlis
Head of Office of Constitutional Court
First classification 
of   administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Deputy head of the Secretariat of the First   Vice-President in the Presidential Administration
Head of division in Presidential Administration
Assistant to the First Vice-President in the   Administration
Deputy head of Office of Milli Mejlis and   Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Administrative 
Department of the   President, Special Medical Service of the President, Cabinet of Ministries,   
and heads of divisions in these state bodies
Head of the Office of the state bodies of the 1stcategory
Second 
classification of   
administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Deputy head of division in the Presidential   Administration
Deputy head of divisions in the Office of Milli   Mejlis and Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, 
Administrative Department of   the President, Special Medical Service of the President, and 
Cabinet of   Ministries
Deputy heads of the Office and heads of divisions of   the state bodies of the1st category
Head of offices of the state bodies of the2nd categoriesin the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
§Heads of state agencies and state services   established under relevant executive power bodies
Third 
classification of   
administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Specialists in the Presidential Administration,   Administrative Department of the President, 
Special Medical Service of the   President, Office of Milli Mejlis, Office of Constitutional Court, 
Office of   Supreme Court, and Office of Cabinet of Ministries
Heads of divisions, their deputies and specialists   of other state bodies directly supporting the 
head of the Azerbaijani state
Deputy heads of state agencies and services under   relevant executive bodies
Deputy heads of division of the state bodies of the 1st   category
Fourth 
classification of   
administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Specialists in the offices of state bodies of the   1st category
Heads of division and their deputies in 2nd-category   state bodies
Deputy heads of division of 2nd-category state   bodies in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic
Deputy heads of relevant executive power bodies
Fifth classification 
of   administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Specialists of 2nd-category state bodies
Heads of office of 3rd-category executive power   bodies in the Nakhichevan Autonomous 
Republic
Heads of division and their deputies of 3rd-category   state bodies
Heads of local division of 4th-category state bodies
Sixth classification 
of   administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
bodies
Specialists of 3rd-category state bodies
Head of division and deputies of relevant   4th-category executive power bodies
Deputy heads of local divisions of 4th-category   state bodies
Heads and their deputies of the local divisions of   state agencies and state services (5th 
category)
Seventh 
classification of   
administrative 
positions in the 
supreme state 
Specialists of relevant executive power bodies ?   state bodies of the 4th and 5th categories, local 
divisions of relevant   executive power bodies, bodies being under and subordinated to relevant   
executive power bodies, regional (city) courts, bodies subordinated to   relevant executive power 
bodies, local divisions of state agencies and state   services established under relevant executive 
power bodies, bodies being   under and subordinated to such state agencies and state services
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Appendix 3. Interview Guide: 
Introduction (for the experts as well) 
1. Explaining what the research is about and presenting consent form.
2. Introducing of the interviewee: (name, gender, age, education level, employment,
and marital status) woman25rec 
Warm-up questions: (for the experts as well) 
3. How do you define corruption?  Its forms?
4. What do you think about the motives behind corruption? (if does not know, give brief
info about need/greed corruption/ petty& grand. 
5. Are there any circumstances under which corruption is justifiable?
Experience in the SEC: 
6. When did you take the exam?
7. What was the result of the exam?
8. What was your thoughts about the SEC before you took the exam in terms of its
fairness? 
9. Was the whole exam process transparent? What tools did they have to ensure
transparency? 
10. Was the whole interview process transparent? What tools did they have to ensure
transparency? 
11. Was there any change in your thoughts after the results published?
Perception about the level of corruption in Azerbaijan (for the experts as well) 
12. How do you perceive level of corruption in public administration?
13. Which organization/agency do you think is most corrupt?
14. Which organization/agency is least corrupt?
15. Compared with other agencies, where do you see place of SEC in terms of
corruption? 
16. Do you have an experience in analyzing work of the SEC?
Own experience with corruption 
17. Have you or someone you know had experience with corruption? (The SEC, other
organization, or both) 
18. Have you or someone you know been asked to pay bribe in the
examination/interview process? 




Research Questions Interview Question
1.How do users   of SEC services perceive the level 
of corruption in the SEC?
Compared with other agencies where do   you see 
place of the SEC in terms of corruption?
What was your thoughts about the SEC   before/after 
you took the exam in terms of its fairness?
2.How do users   of SEC services perceive the 
level of corruption in the SEC?
How do you perceive level of   corruption in public 
administration?
Which organization/agency do you think   is 
most/least corrupt?
3.To what   extent these perceived levels of 
corruption can be linked to users'   
Are there any circumstances under which   
corruption is justifiable
4.How do experts perceive the level of corruption 
in the SEC and the public administration in 
general, in relation to SEC's organizational 
characteristics?
How do you perceive level of   corruption in public 
administration?
Which organization/agency do you think is   
most/least corrupt?
Do you have an experience in   analyzing work of 
the SEC?
